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Defense counsel negotiates a plea bargain for her client; the client will receive
a sentence reduction if during her own prison term, she cooperates with the
prosecution. While serving her sentence, the client fulfills her part of the bar-
gain, but the government drags its feet in honoring its commitment to make a
motion for sentence reduction. Because she has already been sentenced, the
defendant has no attorney to represent her and, when she asks for one, the
court says she has no right to counsel.
The prosecutor meets with an uncharged and uncounselled suspect and nego-
tiates an agreement whereby the suspect will waive indictment and plead
guilty on a future date. No attorney assists the suspect in these negotiations.
When the suspect hires an attorney, the attorney commits malpractice and ut-
terly destroys the plea negotiations. After the suspect, who is now a defendant,
receives a lengthy sentence, he claims he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. The court agrees that the attorney's malpractice was the direct cause
of the failed negotiations. Nevertheless, the court rules against the defendant.
Under Supreme Court law, the suspect had no right to counsel at the pre-
charge negotiations because the government had not yet filed formal charges.
An indigent defendant has appointed counsel. The defendant pleads guilty and
the judge directs him to "cooperate" with a probation officer who will inter-
view him and write a presentence report. Although defense counsel knows that
the probation officer will ask the defendant about sensitive subjects, such as
his prior convictions and his conduct in this case, defense counsel does not at-
tend the interview.
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. For their invaluable assistance, the
author expresses thanks to Professors Robert Force, Catherine Hancock, Jancy Hoeffel, and
Keith Werhan. This Article would not have been possible without committed research hours
provided by many students. The author especially wishes to thank Margaret Wyatt and
Catherine Kendrick. And, of course, thanks to David Levitt, without whom this would not
have been possible.
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Later, the probation officer claims that the defendant lied during the interview.
Accordingly, the officer asks the court to increase the defendant's sentence by
six months for this "obstruction of justice." The defendant protests: he did
not lie; rather, the probation officer's questions were unclear. The judge
hears testimony, credits the probation officer's story, and imposes an en-
hanced sentence. Later, the defendant argues that his attorney's failure to at-
tend the interview constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge
denies his petition outright; because the probation officer is "an arm of the
court, " the presentence interview is not a "critical stage" and the defendant
had no right to assistance of counsel.
The rhetoric of the Sixth Amendment is grand; the reality is grim. The
rhetoric promises that: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.' "[T]he
accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal .... .2 In reality, a mechanical
and rote invocation of a rigid right-to-counsel doctrine deprives modem
criminal defendants of counsel at proceedings that are truly critical stages of
contemporary criminal procedure
The current right-to-counsel doctrine was developed in the 1970's. It
created a bright-line rule still in effect today. The right to counsel attaches
only at "critical stages" of a criminal prosecution. Under this critical stage
doctrine, the right to counsel only attaches after the initiation of formal ad-
versary proceedings and only applies to confrontations between the accused
and the prosecution or law enforcement. In the years following the Su-
preme Court's development of the critical stage doctrine, national trends of
mandatory sentencing and sentencing guidelines revolutionized criminal
procedure and dramatically altered the roles of the system's key players.3
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (emphasis added).
3 The changes wrought by the guidelines have been explored in numerous scholarly works and court
opinions. See, e.g., KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn,
J., concurring); Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, Remarks to the Judges of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
(Nov. 5, 1987), in 117 F.R.D. 459 (1987); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
550 (1978); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Kimberly S. Kelly, Comment, Substantial Assis-
tance Under the Guidelines: How Smitherman Transfers Sentencing Discretion from Judges to Prose-
cutors, 76 IOWA L. REV. 187, 189 (1990); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (1989).
As to particular changes in the role of the defense attoney, see Douglas A. Berman, Defense Advocacy
Under the Guidelines, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 299 (1999).
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Now, defense counsel's role outside the courtroom is substantially am-
plified. Among other things, counsel negotiates about the prosecutor's
charging decisions, bargains over plea agreements, mediates between coop-
erating defendants and the government, assists the defendant in confronting
the probation officer, and advocates in connection with proceedings ancil-
lary to sentence. Applying the bright-line critical stage doctrine to these
new realities of criminal practice creates illogical and patently unfair re-
sults. This Article shows how the critical stage doctrine has failed and pro-
poses a new approach to the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee, one that
will assure fairness in modem criminal procedure.
Part I of this Article explores the historical evolution of the constitu-
tional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Part II offers an over-
view of mandatory minimum sentences, guideline sentences, and the
associated phenomenon of cooperation with authorities. Part III reviews
three specific examples of changes to federal criminal procedure and dem-
onstrates how, when applied in these new contexts, the critical stage doc-
trine fails to guarantee the constitutionally mandated right to counsel.
Finally, Part IV articulates a right-to-counsel doctrine that reflects and pro-
motes basic Sixth Amendment values. It does so by culling from the case
law three indicia that serve as hallmarks of when the right to counsel ap-
plies. These indicia are: (1) an adversariness-in-fact between an individual
and the prosecution, regardless of whether formal proceedings have begun
("adversariness-in-fact"); (2) a substantial complexity in the procedural
stage in question ("complexity"), regardless of whether that procedural
stage is a formal 'confrontation'; and (3) potential prejudice to the individ-
ual that can be countered by providing counsel ("prejudice/benefit"). By
examining the extent to which these three criteria inhere at a specific proce-
dural stage, a court can determine whether that stage is one at which the
right to counsel applies.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The counsel guarantee has never been a rigid or static doctrine.
Rather, it has been an evolving embodiment of the fair process norms of a
given historical context. Thus, the modem Sixth Amendment counsel guar-
antee is, and should be, a radically different guarantee than that contem-
plated by the Framers. An examination of the jurisprudence regarding the
right to counsel demonstrates how the constitutional right to counsel has
historically responded to changing realities of criminal procedure.
A. The Origins of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Guarantee
Enshrining the right to counsel in the Bill of Rights was itself an evolu-
tionary act by the Framers, one that reflected the colonists' evolving fair
process expectations. Traditionally, English law attached no great weight
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to the layperson's need for assistance of counsel in court proceedings.'
Rather, during the mid to late 1700's, English law forbade the assistance of
counsel in nearly all criminal cases.' The law required each defendant "to
appear before the court in his own person and conduct his own cause in his
own words."6
Scholars and historians offer various explanations of this prohibition
on counsel.7 Some point out that criminal prosecutions were initiated by
private parties, who represented themselves; accordingly, self-
representation by defendants was not thought to be unfair.' Others suggest
that a 'level playing field' was enforced by a neutral judge who "viewed in-
dictors, prosecutors, jury, and prisoner with impartial distrust."9 Still others
suggest that the English government banned counsel because the monarchy
was too weak and too unstable to risk the possibility that defense counsel
would achieve the acquittal of accused felons."
In contrast, the colonists rejected the English "private party" prosecu-
tions and adopted a strong public prosecutor system. In that system, a pro-
fessional prosecutor confronted the private citizen. The colonial prosecutor
knew the law, the jury system, and the judge more intimately than could
any individual defendant. This gave the prosecutor an unfair advantage that
colonial lawmakers could not justify." The American impulse to determine
legal rights by reference to the "settled usages and modes of proceeding" of
English law gave way to the realities of an American society that demanded
different protections. 2 Although the early American counsel guarantee was
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (stating that "[i]f recognition of the right of a defen-
dant.., to have the aid of counsel depended upon the existence of a similar right at common law as it
existed in England when our Constitution was adopted," the right to counsel could not be justified as a
necessary component of due process),
5 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1974).
6 Id. (quoting 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed. 1909)). The
sole exceptions were at the outer edges of criminal procedure--counsel was permitted both in misdo-
meanor and treason cases. Scholars have posited that this distinction arose precisely because those ac-
cused of misdemeanors and treason were prosecuted by England's only public prosecutor-the Crown.
This ban on counsel in felony cases persisted until 1836 when Parliament gave criminal defendants the
right to appear through counsel. Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (citing I COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LtMI-
TATIONS 698-700 (8th ed. 1927)); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 825.
7 See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 3-6 (2002). See also Powell, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8 Powell, 287 U.S. at 63 (citing the original Constitution of Georgia (1777)).
9 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 5 (quoting WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 11 (1955)).
10 Id. at n.18 (citing to 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 355); see also
J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800 340-41 (1986); FRANCES H. HELLER,
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 10 (1951).
II ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1992); see also
HELLER, supra note 10.
12 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60, 65 (1932) (citing Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896)).
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a departure from English practice, it quickly became an important and nor-
mative part of the colonists' expectations about procedural fairness. Ac-
cordingly, the new colonies emphasized the right to counsel as a guarantee
against prosecutorial privilege and governmental overreaching. 3
Some colonies fashioned the right to counsel as a constitutional protec-
tion. For example, the New Jersey constitutional right to counsel under-
scored the colonial view that counsel would level the playing field: "all
criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel,
as their prosecutors are, or shall be entitled to."' 4 While less explicit in
their intent to afford defendants a fighting chance against the prosecution,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York also constitu-
tionally guaranteed criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel. 5
Other colonies enacted right-to-counsel legislation that made explicit
the colonists' intent to empower citizens who faced the strength of public
prosecutors. 6 As of 1660, any person indicted in Rhode Island had a statu-
tory right to "procure an attorney to plead any poynt of law that may make
for the cleaning of his innocencye."' 7 The Rhode Island General Assembly
deliberately departed from the British rule because it feared that an innocent
person "yett may not be accomplished with soe much wisdome and knowl-
Many colonies rejected English precedent altogether: in Connecticut, the courts appointed counsel in
any case in which a defendant needed, and was unable to retain, counsel. WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 25 (1955). Other states, like South Carolina, Delaware, and
Pennsylvania, provided counsel to all indigent defendants charged in capital cases. Id. For a more thor-
ough discussion of the colonial approach to the right to counsel, see TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 9-21;
see also HELLER, supra note 10, at 30-32; BEANEY, supra, at 15-21.
13 These documents did not contemplate that the state would provide free representation; rather, the
states merely guaranteed defendants the right to choose whether to retain counsel or to appear pro se.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 823, 828-30 (1974); cf BEANEY, supra note 12, at 8-33. Beaney faults
the Powell court's analysis of the colonists' right to counsel legislation and suggests that the issue was
of little moment to the colonists. Beaney notes the English and American tradition of sua sponte judicial
appointment of counsel and posits that this judicial intervention mooted many fairness concerns other-
wise raised by criminal prosecutions against uncounselled defendants.
14 N.J. CONST. art. XVI (1776) (emphasis added). Even earlier, in 1701, the Penn Charter of Penn-
sylvania promised, "all Criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their
Prosecutors." Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (quoting Penn Charter, art. V). The Delaware Charter of 1701
contained identical language. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 10 (citing Del. Charter of 1701 § V). The
respective 1776 Constitutions of Pennsylvania and Delaware explicitly guaranteed citizens right to coun-
sel. Id. at 10 n.56 (citing to De. Decl. of Rights and Fundamental Ruiles, para. 14 (1776)); id. at 10 n.
60 (citing PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights of Inhabitants of the State of Pa., para IXV).
I5 DEL. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 14; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXI; MASS. CONST. §13 (1780); N.H.
CONST. art. XV; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, ss.7 (1777). For a detailed discussion of the counsel guarantee in
the colonial era, see the Supreme Court's discussion in Powell, 287 U.S. 45 at 61-62.
16 Reviewing non-constitutional colonial sources of law, the United States Supreme Court has con-
cluded that "in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law [concerning
access to counsel], has been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized." Id. at 64; see
also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 11 -13.
17 Id. at II (citing 2 JOHN R. BARTLETT, COLONIAL RECORDS OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 239).
1639
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
edge of the law" as was necessary to invent a meaningful defense. 8 Simi-
larly, the South Carolina legislature justified a statutory right-to-counsel by
asserting that defendants "ought to have proper assistance and all just and
equal means" to defend themselves. 9 By the 1791 enactment of the Bill of
Rights, Virginia, Delaware, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
and New Hampshire all had statutes that granted some right to counsel. 0
The Continental Congress asserted each citizen's right to assistance of
counsel in criminal trials.2' And, when the first Congress considered sev-
eral proposals designed to guarantee fair play at criminal trials,22 one such
proposal guaranteed every citizen a right to appear through any counsel the
citizen could secure.23 This nascent right to counsel was constitutionalized
as the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee, one of several Sixth Amend-
ment rights intended to minimize the public prosecutor's tremendous ad-
vantage24 and to "breathe life into the promise" of other Sixth Amendment
guarantees.25
Of course, the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee had not yet
evolved into the powerful right to counsel we know today. As revolution-
ary as the Sixth Amendment was, the Framers' vision was limited. To
them, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed only that any criminal defendant
who could secure counsel had a right to appear through that counsel.26 And
that guarantee did not extend to persons charged with state crimes. The
federal constitution permitted each state to create its own rules about the
right to counsel in criminal cases. Even after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee was not incorpo-
18 Id. (quoting 2 BARTLETT, supra note 17, at 239).
19 TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 12 n.69-70 (quoting Act of Aug. 20, 1731, para. XLIII, 3 S.C. Stat.
274, 286 (1731)).
20 Id. at 12-13.
21 HELLER, supra note 10, at 21 (citing Declaration of Rights of Congress art. V (1774)). The legis-
lative history of the Continental Congress indicates that its counsel guarantee passed without argument.
Id.
22 Id. at 27-30.
23 Id.
24 GARCIA, supra note 11, at 4; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 827 (1974); HELLER, supra
note 10, at 17; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 117 (1998)
(The Framers designed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to guarantee "basic fair play and symme-
try" in criminal trials.).
25 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 139
(1997). The other Sixth Amendment guarantees are: the right to trial by jury; the right to a speedy and
public trial; the right to confront and compel witnesses; and the right to notice of charges brought
against the individual.
26 United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169 (1891). The federal criminal law provided for a statu-
tory right to appointed counsel for those indigent defendants accused of capital crimes. Federal Crimes
Act of 1790, I Statutes at Large 112, 118 (1790).
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rated to the states.27 Instead, the states made their own decisions about ac-
cess to counsel.
Although there was no federal constitutional mandate of a right to
counsel, as the American legal system evolved, the right to counsel grew
steadily in state constitutions, statutes, and common law. By the early
1930's every state in the union had identified some circumstance in which
the state was required to provide an attorney for an indigent defendant.28
Those circumstances varied widely. Some states provided counsel in all
criminal prosecutions, others only in cases of "serious" crimes; still others
required the appointment of counsel only in capital cases. 29 This rough con-
sensus that in some cases the state should provide counsel for a criminal de-
fendant helped usher in the modem approach to the right to counsel.
B. The Right to Assigned Counsel
The history of the right to assigned counsel reflects, in part, the larger
and more complex history of the Supreme Court's efforts to define the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Whereas the Bill of Rights set
out specific limits on the power of the federal government, 31 the Fourteenth
Amendment was couched in general terms. It prohibited the states from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ' 32 but did not explain what due process required. Thus, whether the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated some or all of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights became an important issue confronting the Supreme Court.
In the context of the right to counsel, the Court first attempted to re-
solve that question in the famous "Scottsboro Boys" case.33 There, the
Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not incor-
porated to the states; rather, state court defendants' only right to counsel
arose from the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Nevertheless,
the Powell Court's analysis reflected the same values that motivated the
colonists to reject the English rule and favor a right to counsel. And its de-
cision reflected the colonists' evolutionary intent: to create a level playing
field for the defendant who faced a complex legal system, confronted an
experienced prosecutor, and risked the loss of liberty or life.
27 See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
28 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
29 Id.
30 For a broad overview of the incorporation debate, see ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 94-
99 (1964). For a broad critique of all sides of the incorporation debate, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1998). A discussion of the reasons for incorporating the Sixth Amendment to the
states is beyond the scope of this Article.
31 See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (noting that the
Bill of Rights in general, and Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendments in particular, apply only to the federal
government).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
33 See infra Part l.B. I.
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1. Powell v. Alabama and the Fundamental Fairness Test.-In Pow-
ell v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that nine young Afri-
can-Americans were deprived of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment when a trial judge assigned counsel to represent them on the
morning of their capital trial. Thus, it was not that the "boys" (as the trial
court called them) had no counsel. Rather it was that the defendants had
abysmally poor counsel who had been appointed so late as to prevent coun-
sel from conducting any investigation, consultation, or preparation for the
case.34 The Court held that such poor representation was the same as a de-
nial of the right to counsel, and that denial "contravenes the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."35
Powell's holding was quite limited; it applied only to capital cases in
which an indigent defendant was "incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy or the like[.]" 36
In such cases, due process of law required a court to assign counsel at "a
time or under such circumstances" that counsel could provide meaningful
assistance "in the preparation and trial of the case."37
Nevertheless, Powell's impact was enormous.38 For the purposes of
this Article, Powell's significance lay in two important aspects of the
Court's analysis. First, Powell articulated two important principles-that
fair process was an essential element of an adversary system of criminal
procedure; and, that counsel could guarantee that fair process by providing
some parity between the strength and skill of the prosecution and defense.
Second, Powell demonstrated an important technique for Sixth Amendment
right-to-counsel analysis; the Court made a concrete, real-world assessment
of how counsel actually assists a criminal defendant.
In addressing the practical consequences of the failure to appoint coun-
sel, the Court echoed the colonists' views about counsel and addressed the
tremendous advantage a public prosecutor had over an unrepresented de-
fendant. The Court acknowledged that the complexity of the legal system
increased the prosecutor's advantage. Faced with the complex "science of
law" and the rules of evidence, a layperson could not mount a meaningful
defense.39 The Court also considered the risk of substantial prejudice that
might befall an unrepresented defendant. For example, that defendant
34 Powell, 287 U.S. at 62.
35 Id. at 61.
36 Id. at 71.
37 Id.; see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942) (discussing Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940), in which the court considered whether Alabama's appointment of counsel for Avery was
"mere lip service").
38 For a discussion of the court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee prior to
the Powell decision, see HELLER, supra note 10. Of course, by the time the Court heard Powell, the
"Scottsboro boys" were a cause celebrd and their innocence was generally presumed by most of the pub-
lic. See JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO xi-xii (1994).
39 Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
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might be convicted upon a defective indictment or be sentenced more
harshly than the law allowed.4 ° Counsel would mitigate those risks by re-
viewing the indictment, requiring strict compliance with the law, and gen-
erally holding the prosecution to its burden.4'
Underlying its application of fair process principles to facts, was the
Court's basic concern with assuring the integrity of the adversary system.
To the Powell Court, the trial court's failure to provide the defendants
meaningful assistance of counsel irreparably compromised the integrity of
the outcome because the proceedings were thereafter so "lopsided" that nei-
ther fair process nor truthful results could have been obtained.
While it limited its holding to Powell's particular facts, the Powell
Court did set out the constitutional baseline for other criminal cases.
Henceforth the constitution would require that a trial judge analyze whether
due process required the appointment of counsel, even if the defendant did
not request such assistance. Thus, in a due process context, the Court re-
turned to the spirit of fair play that motivated the colonists who broke with
English tradition and created a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Powell's
holding, which required a meaningful appointment of counsel, was based
upon a profound commitment to fairness in the adversarial system.
2. The Sixth Amendment Analysis of the Right to Appointed Coun-
sel.-Powell did not reflect any preconception about a right to appointed
counsel nor was Powell an attempt to bestow a new federal constitutional
right by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. When Powell was decided,
there was no federal constitutional right to appointed counsel. The Sixth
Amendment merely guaranteed the right to any counsel a defendant could
obtain.42 Six years after Powell, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel in all federal prose-
cutions.
a. One step forward.-In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court
considered the case of two United States marines, arrested and changed
with possession and use of counterfeit money.43 In January of 1935, on a
single day, the marines were "arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced to
four and on-half years in the penitentiary."44 Upon consideration of the de-
fendants' petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel withheld "from federal courts in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel."45
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169 (1891).
43 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 460 (1938).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 463 (citations omitted).
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Although the Zerbst Court did not rely upon the due process clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, it nevertheless echoed both Powell's
principled due process analysis and Powell's practical, results-oriented con-
cerns about the integrity of an adversary proceeding in which untrained lay-
persons faced a complex legal system and confronted a professional
adversary.
As in Powell, the Court considered the complexity of the criminal jus-
tice system and concluded that it was an "obvious truth" that "the average
defendant" lacked "professional legal skill[s] to protect himself."46 In con-
trast, the defendant faced a professional adversary who was an "experienced
and learned counsel."47 The complexity of the legal system meant that mat-
ters "simply, orderly and necessary to the lawyer," might nevertheless be
"intricate, complex and mysterious" to the "untrained layman."48
Quoting directly from Powell, the Court insisted that the "the right to
be heard" means the "the right to be heard by counsel."49 Characterizing the
counsel guarantee as an "essential barrier[] against arbitrary or unjust depri-
vation of human rights,"5 the Court declined to follow the historical rule
that the counsel guarantee conferred only the right to be heard through any
counsel a defendant could procure. Instead, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment counsel clause required the appointment of counsel to all indi-
gent defendants in federal criminal cases because appointment of counsel
would "level the playing field" and promote truly adversarial proceedings.
Thus, the Court gave meaning to the Sixth Amendment's promise by con-
forming its counsel guarantee to the realities of the criminal justice system.
This absolute mandate was a marked departure from Powell's case-by-
case approach to the right to counsel. After Zerbst, federal courts would
appoint counsel for even the most sophisticated and intelligent indigent fed-
eral criminal defendant. Still, state courts continued to be governed by state
constitutions, state statutes, and the case-by-case 'fundamental fairness' rule
articulated in the Powell decision.
b. Two steps back.-In Betts v. Brady, a decade after Powell, and
only four years after Zerbst, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to take
another step forward. The Court could have merged the holdings of Powell
and Zerbst, extending the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel to
defendants charged in state courts.5 Or, the Court could have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of "fundamental fairness" was coexten-





50 Id. at 462.
51 GARCIA, supra note 11, at 8 (commenting that, in wake of Powell and Zerbst, Betts was illogical
and counterintuitive).
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the Court's opinion was a regrettable, but short-lived, retreat from the prin-
ciples articulated in Powell and Zerbst. Although Betts paid lip service to
the fair process ideals of Powell and Zerbst, its holding belied that rhetoric.
Betts considered whether a state court defendant had been deprived of
any constitutional rights when he was convicted and sentenced without the
assistance of counsel.2 Declining to extend the right to appointed counsel
to all state court defendants, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment
counsel guarantee. 3 Therefore, state court defendants were entitled to ap-
pointed counsel only under the general guarantees afforded by the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause, and only if the case presented
"special circumstances" indicating that a trial without counsel would violate
"fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."54
Not surprisingly, as the law of the land, Betts proved thoroughly unsat-
isfactory. Betts provided state courts with little or no guidance as to when
due process required the appointment of counsel and courts struggled with
the fine calculations required to determine whether an uncounselled defen-
dant had been denied due process.5 As a consequence, federal courts heard
an increasing number of post-conviction claims alleging that a particular pe-
titioner had been deprived of due process of law in a particular case under a
particular set of circumstances. This proved highly inefficient and led to
anomalous results. In 1963, the Supreme Court reconsidered Betts. 6
c. Gideon v. Wainwright.--Clarence Earl Gideon was an itiner-
ant drifter and gambler, accused of stealing from a local pool hall. Gideon,
who was ultimately acquitted, spent two years in a state penitentiary while
he fought for and won the right to appointed counsel. In a case that lacked
"special circumstances," Gideon nevertheless claimed that he had a Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Overruling Betts, the Su-
preme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel had full
force and effect in state court prosecutions. 7
52 Betts, 316 U.S. at 457. The Betts Court surveyed state constitutions and concluded that, in the
majority of states, "it was the considered judgment of the people, their representatives, and their courts
that the appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right." It is worth noting that the Court's sweeping
generalization ignored the substantial body of state common and statutory law favoring the appointment
of counsel for indigent criminal defendants.
53 Id.
54 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (citations omitted) (citing Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
55 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1963) ("Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 2595, was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant's federal
constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation
in both state and federal courts.").
56 Id. at 338.
57 Id. at 342.
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The Supreme Court denied that Gideon announced a new rule. Rather,
the Court asserted that Betts had been an "abrupt break with its own well-
considered precedents" concerning the fundamental fairness of appointing
counsel to indigent defendants.58 The Court reviewed its holdings in Powell
and Zerbst and focused on those cases' evident concern with "a fair system
of justice."59 In so doing, it considered what assistance was necessary to
give meaning to the Sixth Amendment's promise of fair process.
First, as it had in Powell and Zerbst, the Court considered the practical
realities of the criminal justice system confronting Gideon.6" It compared
the relative resources of an indigent defendant and a professional prosecu-
tor, noting that "[g]ovemments, both state and federal, quite properly spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime."'" Then, the Court assessed society's expectations about fairness in
the criminal justice system and concluded that there was a "widespread be-
lief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."62 Most
importantly, the Court concluded that where .an outmatched and outmaneu-
vered layperson confronted a professional prosecutor in the complex arena
of criminal law, there could be no fair process. "[A]ny person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him."63  Accordingly, the Court held that Sixth
Amendment guarantee to appointed counsel was "fundamental and essential
to a fair trial" and was incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.64
d. United States v. Wade.-In United States v. Wade,65 the Court
expanded on Gideon's promise by holding that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions"66 extended to pretrial proceedings
whenever such assistance was necessary to guarantee a fair trial. It did so
by considering whether Billy Joe Wade, who was accused of bank robbery,
had a right to have his attorney's assistance at a pre-trial line-up identifica-
tion procedure.6
Addressing Wade's right-to-counsel claim, the Court characterized its
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as an evolving doctrine, designed to iden-
tify and construct a right to counsel that guaranteed procedural fairness.
58 Id. at 343-44.
59 Id.
60 In this regard, by asserting that counsel's constitutional function was to even the playing field be-
tween defendant and prosecutor, Gideon harkened back to the earliest colonial precedents.
61 Id. at 344.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 342 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942)).
65 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
66 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67 Id. at 220.
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Accordingly, the Court eschewed historical limitations in favor of modem
solutions that fit the new realities of criminal procedure.
The Court noted that the Framers themselves envisioned a counsel
guarantee that would respond to the actualities of the American system. It
then discussed changes in American criminal procedure. It observed that
when the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment, "there were no organized
police forces;"68 rather, a defendant "confronted the prosecutor... and the
evidence was marshaled, largely at the trial itself."69 The Court contrasted
that simple procedure with the complex "machinery" of 1960's law en-
forcement, which might "involve[] critical confrontations of the accused by
the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."7 It then
concluded that the plain wording of the Sixth Amendment was sufficiently
broad to encompass a right to counsel whenever modem criminal proceed-
ings posed a significant risk to a defendant's fair trial and that risk which
could be avoided or mitigated by counsel's assistance.7'
Having laid the theoretical groundwork for its Sixth Amendment
analysis, the Court asked whether, at this "pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused ... the presence of his counsel [was] necessary to preserve the defen-
dant's basic right to a fair trial."7 To answer that question, the Court once
again focused on the "real world" of criminal practice.
The Court considered two factors. First, it evaluated the line-up's "po-
tential substantial prejudice" ("prejudice") to Wade's case. Second, it con-
sidered whether counsel's participation at the proceeding would
meaningfully benefit the defendant by helping him avoid or mitigate that
prejudice ("benefit").73
As to the prejudice analysis, the Court revisited Powell and other fun-
damental fairness cases for the proposition that pretrial proceedings might
be the most critical period of any criminal prosecution.74 The Court consid-
ered the extent to which an identification procedure conducted without de-
fense counsel might "crucially derogate from a fair trial."75  The court
identified two specific risks Wade faced: first, a false identification based




71 Id. at 225 ("The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assistance whenever
necessary to assure a meaningful 'defense'.").
72 Id. at 227.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 225.
75 Id. at 228.
76 Id. (expressing serious concern about suggestive identification practices and discussing the types
of procedures that create that risk). Those procedures include creating a lineup in which all "but the
suspect were known to the identifying witness;" participants other than the suspect were "grossly dis-
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second, the likelihood that once a jury heard a witness state "that's the
man," a jury would credit the false identification.77 As to both risks, the
Court concluded there was "grave potential for prejudice." 8
In its "benefit" analysis, the Court took a practical approach. It recog-
nized that counsel's presence might itself be a deterrent to suggestive iden-
tification procedures. As to the possible outcome at trial, the Court
considered how counsel might undermine an eyewitness identification. An
effective cross-examination would require counsel to reconstruct the lineup
for the jury, thereby exposing any improprieties. Could an attorney who
did not attend the lineup "reconstruct the manner and mode of [a] lineup
identification[?]"79 The Court rejected the possibility that counsel could ob-
tain the necessary information from another source. First, the accused
could not adequately assist counsel since he might not understand or iden-
tify any "improper influences."" ° Second, the victim could not be consid-
ered an objective observer. Finally, the other lineup participants would be
law enforcement officers or individuals undiscoverable by the defense."'
Thus, defense counsel's presence at the proceeding was necessary; other-
wise, counsel could not otherwise conduct effective cross-examination
about this highly prejudicial evidence. 2
Underlying the Court's analysis was a profound commitment to the
idea that defense counsel guaranteed the integrity of the adversary system.
Indeed, when the United States argued that affording a right to counsel at a
lineup might permit a defendant to successfully impeach correct identifica-
tions, thereby obtaining acquittals for the guilty, 3 the Court's response was
unequivocal. A vigorous defense counsel "plays a vital role" in the adver-
sary system: it would be "contrary to the basic assumptions upon which
similar in appearance to the suspect;" only the suspect wore the type of clothing the witness had seen;
the witness is primed to make an identification when the police tell the witness "they have caught the
culprit;" and then let the witness view the suspect alone. Id. at 233.
77 Id. at 236. See also id. at 235 (noting that "the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom
identification in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification," meaning that "[t]he trial which might
determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confronta-
tion."); id. at 228 (discussing wrongful convictions based on "the vagaries of eyewitness identification").
78 Id. at 236.
79 Id. at 230.
80 Id. at 230-31.
81 Id. at 231.
82 Id. at 239. This prejudice/benefit analysis was a flexible approach that was designed to respond
to changes in police practices and criminal procedure. The Court did not presume that lineups would
always be critical stages of a criminal prosecution. Rather, the Court assumed that changes in police
practices might eliminate the risks that made a lineup a critical stage, thereby "remov[ing] the basis" for
a right to counsel at the procedure.
83 Id. at 239. The government also argued that recognizing a right to counsel at lineups might delay
important investigative work. The Court pointed out that any delay could be avoided by obtaining sub-
stitute counsel who could "eliminate the risks" of the identification proceeding by providing the sus-
pect's attorney with the information necessary to conduct effective cross-examination. Id. at 241.
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[the] Court has operated in Sixth Amendment cases" to waive aside a right
to counsel because counsel might thereby better assist the accused.84
e. Mempa v. Rhay.-In Mempa v. Rhay, the Court used its
prejudice/benefit analysis to affirm that the Sixth Amendment conferred a
right to counsel at sentence.85 Mempa considered a sentencing statute that
permitted a judge to impose and defer a felony sentence by placing the de-
fendant on probation.86 A probation violation would give rise to a subse-
quent proceeding at which the court would terminate the probation and
impose the maximum custodial sentence authorized by law.87 However, the
judge would also give the state parole board a highly subjective recommen-
dation about how much time the defendant should actually serve. The
board would then rely on that recommendation in deciding when to parole
the defendant.88 The question before the Court was whether a defendant
had a right to counsel at this second sentence proceeding.
The Court conducted its Sixth Amendment analysis by referring to ear-
lier sentencing cases decided under Betts' "special circumstances" rule. In
particular, the Court looked to Townsend v. Burke, a sentencing case in
which the Supreme Court had held that the absence of counsel during
Townsend's sentencing violated due process. 9 At Townsend's sentence,
the judge was under the misconception that Townsend had been convicted
of numerous prior offenses. After a brief review of what he believed to be
Townsend's criminal history, the judge sentenced Townsend to "[t]en to
twenty in the Penitentiary."9 The Court noted that Townsend had a due
process right not to be sentenced "on misinformation or misreading of court
records."'" Therefore, on due process grounds, the Supreme Court reversed
Townsend's sentence.92
Applying Townsend to Mempa, the Court first held that, stripped of its
special circumstances analysis, Townsend "illustrates the critical nature of
sentencing." Using its Sixth Amendment prejudice/benefit analysis, the
84 Id. at 237-38. In later cases, the Supreme Court retreated from this absolute view. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (no right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases
unless defendant is sentenced to jail because extension of the right would "impose unpredictable, but
necessarily substantial costs").
85 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
86 Id. at 130.
87 Id. at 135
88 Id. at 131 n.2, 135.
89 Id. at 134 (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)).
90 Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740.
91 Id. at 740.
92 Id. at 741. Under the special circumstances rule, the Court had held that Townsend's uncoun-
selled plea of guilty did not, in and of itself, violate due process. Id. at 740 (citing Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948) (holding that an uncounselled defendant's plea of guilty is not a per se violation of the
due process clause)); id. at 739.
93 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134.
1649
97:1635 (2003)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Court noted that the risk of possible prejudice to a defendant was high be-
cause he might be sentenced "on the basis of assumptions concerning his
criminal record which were materially untrue."94 The benefit to be con-
ferred by counsel was obvious; counsel would have mitigated that potential
prejudice by correcting the record. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel inhered at sentencing.
Having concluded that felony defendants had a right to counsel at sen-
tencing, the Court next considered whether the deferred sentencing proce-
dure at issue was, in fact, an adversary sentence proceeding.95 First, the
Court took a hard look at the proceedings below. The defendants had re-
sponded to allegations about new criminal conduct and probation officers
had testified, without being subjected to any cross-examination.96 The
judge made factual findings that resulted in the imposition of a jail sen-
tence. In addition, the judge made a recommendation to the parole board,
which helped determine the length of the defendants' incarceration.97 Fi-
nally, at that proceeding, the defendants had one last opportunity to move to
withdraw their previous pleas of guilty to the underlying offense and ob-
tained their first opportunity to appeal the imposition of the sentence.98
Considering the significant risks posed by the proceeding, the Court re-
jected the State's position that the revocation proceeding was a "mere for-
mality" and not a sentence. "[W]hether it be labeled a revocation of
probation or a deferred sentencing," a defendant faced substantial potential
prejudice that counsel could mitigate.99 For example, by "marshaling the
facts, [and] introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances" counsel
might influence the Court's recommendation to the parole board.' 0 Simi-
larly, counsel could ensure the defendant would be fully aware of "certain
legal rights [that might] be lost if not exercised."'0 '
Of course, Mempa did more than announce a right to counsel at sen-
tence. Like Wade, it spoke to the critical importance of taking a flexible
and "real world" approach to the counsel guarantee. And, like Wade, it also
94 Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741.
95 The State never argued that there was no right to counsel at sentence. Rather, the State argued
that the defendants had been 'sentenced' when they received their probation and deferred sentence. Ac-
cording to the State, the subsequent imposition of the maximum term of incarceration was part of a pro-
bation revocation proceeding, not a 'sentence' proceeding. Therefore, the State insisted, no right to
counsel inhered.
96 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 131-32.
97 Id. at 135.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 137.
100 Id.
Id. The Court also considered the practicality of giving indigent defendants a right to counsel at
sentence. Responding to the State's contention that such a right would overtax the system, the Court
concluded that "trial counsel appointed for the purpose of the trial or guilty plea would not be unduly
burdened by ... the deferred sentencing stage of the proceeding." Id. at 137.
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demonstrated the Court's commitment to examining substance rather than
relying on semantics.
Notwithstanding the Court's rulings in Wade and Mempa, the Court
still faced complex questions about the right to counsel."2 Among those
questions were two of particular relevance to this Article. Does a defendant
in a criminal case have a right to counsel at all procedural stages? If so,
when would such a right begin and end? °3 The Supreme Court's "critical
stage" doctrine answers these questions. Unfortunately, its answers have
proved inadequate to guarantee a meaningful right to counsel in the twenty-
first century.
3. The Bright-Line Critical Stage Doctrine"3 .- The critical stage
doctrine can be stated succinctly. First, the right to counsel attaches only
after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings by "formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."'' 5 Second,
102 This Article does not discuss the significant but short-lived right-to-counsel doctrine espoused in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo appeared to establish a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in during stationhouse interrogations. Immediately following Escobedo, the Supreme Court de-
cided Miranda v. Arizona and adopted a broad prophylactic rule addressing the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The scholarly consensus is that the Court
thereafter abandoned the Escobedo Sixth Amendment reasoning in favor of a Fifth Amendment analysis.
See, e.g., W. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.4(c) (3d ed. 2000). There is a significant body
of case law and scholarly literature that addresses whether the right to counsel inheres in interrogation
by law enforcement and law enforcement agents. For discussion of this aspect of the right to counsel,
see James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against Informations:
Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I (1998) and James J. Tomkovicz,
Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975 (1986).
103 The Court's right to counsel rulings raised other questions concerning the types of case in which
the right applied and the manner in which states would provide appointed counsel. For a discussion of
the types of cases at which the Sixth Amendment counsel right applies, see Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in proceeding to terminate pa-
rental rights); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (finding a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases re-
sulting in actual imprisonment); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (finding no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in court martial proceedings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
(finding a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases resulting in actual imprisonment); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (finding due process right to counsel, not a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, where juvenile
in civil proceeding may face loss of liberty). For a discussion of the practical difficulties in implement-
ing the Gideon decision, see Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise
of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986).
104 The term "critical" was first used to describe stages of criminal procedure in a Sixth Amendment
context in Powell v. Alabama, when the Court described the pretrial period as "perhaps the most critical
period of the proceedings." 287 U.S. at 57. This result was obtained by searching the Lexis Supreme
Court database for the terms "counsel" and "critical" and "Sixth Amendment" in the same document.
Although the terms do appear together in cases prior to Powell, none address the right to counsel nor do
they presage the development of the critical stage doctrine. Later, the Court used the term "critical" to
describe stages of the criminal process in cases such as Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
105 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In dicta, some Courts of Appeals have suggested
that the "formal initiation" rule give way when the circumstances clearly indicate that the "adverse posi-
tions of government and defendant" have solidified. See, e.g., Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291
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the right to counsel applies only to those proceedings that are "trial-like"
procedures at which the defendant personally confronts the prosecutor or
the intricacies of the criminal justice system." 6 These are bright-line rules,
not subject to exceptions or modifications.
This bright-line approach to the critical stage doctrine has largely swal-
lowed up the flexible and realistic right-to-counsel analysis so prominently
featured in Gideon, Wade, and Mempa. °7 However, the contemporary con-
tours of criminal procedure require that the Court once again consider the
reality, and not the rhetoric, of the Sixth Amendment promise.
a. Kirby v. Illinois.-In Kirby v. Illinois, the Court announced a
restrictive rule for when the right to counsel attaches and thereby substan-
tially contracted the scope of its previous Sixth Amendment inquiry.
Whereas Wade inquired about potential prejudice and the utility of counsel,
Kirby imposed temporal and procedural limits upon that right without re-
gard to any risks an uncounselled defendant faced. The Court relied in
large measure upon the assumption that criminal cases began, progressed,
and ended in a linear, trial-oriented way. The Court held that the right to
counsel inheres only after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings
through "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or ar-
raignment." ' 8
Kirby's facts would easily have lent themselves to a Wade-type analy-
sis. The police arrested Thomas Kirby and took him to the police station.
They then brought a robbery victim to the station where, upon seeing Kirby
(1st Cir. 1995) (right to counsel may attach before indictment or arraignment); Matteo v. Superinten-
dent, 171 F.3d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824 (1999) (right to counsel may attach,
even if formal adversary proceedings have not begun if "accused is confronted, just as at trial, by the
procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both") (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S.
180, 189 (1984)); United States ex. rel. Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986) (unclear whether a
criminal "prosecution" can start before formal adversary proceedings begin); United States v. Larkin,
978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992) (right to counsel may attach before formal charges if government
steps over "the constitutionally significant divide from fact-finder to adversary") (quoting Hall, 804 F.2d
at 82)). Two reported federal court opinions-both at the district court level-have endorsed in princi-
ple the idea that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can attach in the absence of formal adversary
proceedings. See Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (D. Del. 1981); United States v.
Busse, 814 F. Supp. 760, 763 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
106 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends only
through sentencing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Supreme Court has also ruled,
on Due Process and Equal Protection grounds, that the state must provide an indigent defendant with
counsel's assistance on the first appeal of right. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). In this author's opinion, the Supreme Court should have decided these
cases on Sixth Amendment grounds. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, there are strong
legal and policy reasons to prefer a specific Sixth Amendment analysis over a generalized substantive
due process or equal protection analysis. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (stating that,
wherever possible, the Court prefers to rely upon a specific amendment instead of turning to a substan-
tive due process analysis).
107 See discussion infra Part II.
108 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
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in a holding cell, he identified Kirby as his attacker.'09 Almost two months
later, a grand jury indicted Kirby. Only then did the court appoint counsel
to represent him. Relying on Wade, Kirby's attorney moved to suppress the
"show-up" identification, arguing that Kirby had a right to have counsel
present at this pre-indictment identification proceeding.
Had the Court followed the inquiry laid out in Wade, it would have
asked whether, under the facts of Kirby's case, the 'show-up' identification
was a "critical confrontation ... where the results might well settle the ac-
cused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.""'  Or, the Court
might have recalled its holdings in Powell, where it held that the right to the
assistance of counsel is central to the validity of the adversary system and
that the deprivation of counsel can create such inequality between adversar-
ies that any resulting outcome lacks fundamental fairness."' Instead, a plu-
rality of the Court ignored the prejudice/benefit analysis and failed to
address the fairness implications heretofore so prominently featured in the
Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence. The Kirby court never considered
whether the show-up identification rendered Kirby's trial a "mere formal-
ity," nor did it seriously consider whether counsel's presence might have
helped Kirby avoid the substantial prejudice that inheres at a show-up iden-
tification.
Although the plurality conceded that the counsel guarantee was not
limited to assistance at trial, it asserted that the phrase "criminal prosecu-
tion" limited the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee to those proceed-
ings in which "adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated.""' 2 This
narrow reading of the text of the counsel guarantee was utterly foreign to
the Court's previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. None of the Court's
major right-to-counsel cases considered the meaning of the term 'prosecu-
tion.' Gideon had clearly announced that the Framers' vision of the crimi-
nal justice system did not limit the operation of the counsel guarantee.
Even as a textual exposition, the Court's opinion was a dismal failure. The
Court never discussed what the Framers' understanding of the term 'prose-
cution' might have been, nor did it offer any support for its assertion that
the "evolving" understanding of the right to counsel should be limited by
the Framers' understanding of that term. To the extent that the Court con-
ducted any analysis, it was a historical analysis of its own cases. The Jus-
tices surveyed several significant right-to-counsel cases and concluded they
all arose in a procedural posture "at or after the initiation of adversary judi-
cial criminal procedures.""' 3 The Court then transformed this previously
109 Id. at 689.
I 10 Id. at 699 (citations omitted).
I Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
112 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
113 Id. at 689. The sole exception to that trend was Escobedo v. Illinois, a case the Court had al-
ready limited to its specific facts. Id.
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undiscussed common denominator into an indispensable element of the
right to counsel. Henceforth, the Kirby plurality concluded, the right to
counsel would only attach "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal procedures.""' 4 It would not matter whether those procedures were
termed "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or ar-
raignment."" 5
The Kirby plurality stressed that it did not intend the "adversary judi-
cial criminal proceedings" boundary as a "mere formalism.""' 6 Rather, the
plurality asserted that formal criminal proceedings were "the starting point
of our whole system of adversary criminal justice.""' 7 Only after starting
formal criminal proceedings would the government have "committed itself
to prosecute" thereby solidifying the "adverse positions of government and
defendant.""' 8 This concern with the adverse positions of government and
defendant, a search for 'adversariness-in-fact,' was rhetorically similar to
the Court's language in earlier cases. However, the insistence that proce-
dural postures determine constitutional entitlements was a radical departure.
Some justices relied upon this aspect of the plurality opinion to con-
clude that the right to counsel could attach prior to the initiation of formal
adversary proceedings if adversary positions had solidified and the govern-
ment was truly committed to prosecuting the defendant.' This has not
been the accepted view. The Supreme Court has held that Kirby sets out a
bright-line rule: the right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of
formal adversary proceedings. 2°
Thus, Kirby began the Court's march toward a narrow and rigid rule
firmly delineating the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches. Having drawn a bright line, the Court then considered which post-





118 Id. Whatever the merit of that view was in 1972, it is no longer a correct statement of fact. For
a discussion of the prevalence of pre-charge plea bargaining in which the government and the defendant
are clearly adversaries, see infra Part III.A.
119 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 193 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Kirby] does not
foreclose the possibility that the right to counsel might under some circumstances attach prior to the
formal initiation of judicial proceedings.").
120 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 303 n.3 (1973) ("Kirby v. Illinois forecloses application
of the Sixth Amendment to events before the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings."). Kirby was
followed by a long series of decisions shoring up the artificial boundaries it had established. See, e.g.,
Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 180; see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1995) (noting Kirby's limit
on attachment of the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee makes the guarantee offense-specific: the
right to counsel does not attach as to crimes under investigation, even if the right has already attached as
to a formally charged crime). The Court's offense-specific doctrine, which it recently expanded in
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), merits challenges similar to those posed in this Article. However,
that topic is well beyond the scope of this piece.
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Ash, the Court concluded that the right to counsel would arise only at pro-
ceedings that are "trial-like confrontations."'2 '
b. United States v. Ash.-As in Wade and Kirby, the issues in
Ash were posed in the context of an identification case. A government in-
former accused Ash of bank robbery. The prosecutor showed eyewitnesses
five "mug shots" of men who generally fit the robber's description, Ash's
photograph was among them. Four witnesses tentatively identified Ash as
the robber.'22 Approximately two months later, a grand jury indicted Ash
on robbery charges.'23
In preparation for trial, the prosecutor asked the eyewitnesses to view a
photographic array of five individuals, one of whom was Ash.'24 At trial,
and over the objections of defense counsel, the Court admitted the photo-
graphic array into evidence.'25 On appeal, Ash and his attorney argued that
the prosecution violated Ash's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
Ash's attorney had not been present for the photo-identification proce-
dure. 6 Relying on Wade, Ash argued that without observing the proce-
dure, his attorney could not prepare a meaningful cross-examination about
the identification procedure.'27
A Supreme Court majority ruled against Ash and, in so doing, substan-
tially reinterpreted Wade. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun first re-
iterated the history of the Court's Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel
cases.'28 Acknowledging the Court's historical commitment to a "real
world" approach, Justice Blackmun asserted that from "changing patterns of
criminal procedure and investigation"'29 came an expanded understanding
of the right to counsel. 3 ° Although the Court gave a nod to the preju-
dice/benefit analysis so prominently featured in Wade, it declined to rest its
decision on that reasoning. 3' Instead, the majority asserted that Wade's
outcome had depended upon the fact that Wade had been present at the line-
121 Ash, 413 U.S. at 303. Because of changes in criminal procedure, this limitation has had disas-
trous consequences. See discussion infra Part III.
122 Ash, 413 U.S. at 302.
123 Id.
124 Although the crime was committed in 1965, the trial date was set nearly three years later, in
1968. By then, the Supreme Court had decided United States v. Wade and announced its rule regarding
the right to counsel at critical pretrial stages. Id. at 303.
125 Id. at 304.
126 Id. at 305. Ash's case reached the Supreme Court nearly one year after the decision in Kirby v.
Illinois. Because Kirby "forecloses application of the Sixth Amendment to events before the initiation
of adversary criminal proceedings," Ash did not argue that he had a right to counsel at the initial show-
ing of the "mug shots." Id. at 303 n.3.
127 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967).
128 Ash, 413 U.S. at 306.
129 Id. at 310.
130 Id.
'31 Id. at 314-15.
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up and was therefore personally "confronted" by the prosecution."' In sup-
port of this view, the Court argued that its recent Sixth Amendment deci-
sions had all involved "trial-like confrontations" at which the lawyer
"continued to act as a spokesman for, or advisor to, the accused."'33 Thus
the Court converted its previous focus on equality between adversaries into
a concern about the form in which the adversary interests were expressed.
As it had in Kirby, the Court considered the systemic consequences of
its decision and noted that applying Wade outside of this "confrontation"
context would "result in drastic expansion of the right to counsel."' 34 By
placing this restrictive gloss on Wade, the Court announced a new rule: an
event constitutes a "critical stage" only when the accused confronts the
"procedural system" or an "expert adversary.""'3 Accordingly, the Court
held that because Ash was not present at the identification procedure, he
was not entitled to have his counsel present either.'36
Requiring the right to counsel to depend upon whether the stage in
question was a "trial-like confrontation" was a radical departure from
Wade. Wade's right to counsel had not depended upon the fact that the
line-up was an adversary situation analogous to a trial confrontation.'37 Nor
had Wade's right to counsel depended upon the fact that counsel might
have advised him about his behavior or demeanor at the lineup.'38 Rather,
Wade's right to counsel had depended entirely upon two factors: (1) he was
in an adversary relationship with the government; and, (2) his counsel's
presence at the lineup was necessary to guarantee the meaningful cross-
examination that would be necessary to provide "effective assistance of
counsel" at the subsequent adversary trial.'39
132 Id. at 314.
133 Id. at 312. As Justice Brennan aptly noted in his dissent, the Massiah case addressed whether
federal agents could eavesdrop upon the statements of an indicted defendant. Id. at 339 n. 17 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Thus, not all of the Court's recent Sixth Amendment cases involved confrontations.
134 Id. at 316 (citing with approval United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1969)
(stating that the right to counsel is intended "to prevent the defendant himself from falling into traps
devised by a lawyer on the other side and to see to it that all available defenses are proffered.")
(emphasis added)).
135 Id. at 310. An extended critique of the Court's ruling in Ash is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, one may fairly assert that the majority "stretches" to refashion Wade's ruling. See, e.g., id. at
322-44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 317.
137 Although Wade had referred to the identification proceeding as a "pretrial confrontation," no-
where had the Court restricted its analysis to stages that involved "trial-like" confrontations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967).
138 Ash, 413 U.S. at 324 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring).
139 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). The Wade court did not consider whether the proceeding was trial-
like; it considered only whether "counsel's absence at [pretrial] stages.., might derogate from [the de-
fendant's] right to a fair trial." Wade, 388 U.S. at 226. Had the Court intended to make confrontation
the sine qua non of the right to counsel, it had ample opportunity to do so in Wade, when it distinguished
a lineup from other types of prosecutorial trial preparation, such as analysis of hair, clothing, and blood.
According to the Court, those examinations were not critical stages because the general state of scien-
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Thus, from Wade's expansive promise, the Court retreated to a critical
stage doctrine in which the right to counsel was limited to those situations
that involved "trial-like confrontations.""'4 This narrow understanding of
when and why the counsel guarantee should apply led the Court to ask
whether counsel's cross-examination "can serve as a substitute for counsel
[assisting] at the pretrial confrontation"? 4' Yet, the Court maintained that
the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee had evolved and expanded when
"new contexts appear [that present] the same dangers that gave birth ini-
tially to the right itself."'4 As set forth in Part II, infra, the new federal sen-
tencing scheme exemplifies one such novel context.
II. MANDATORY SENTENCING, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, AND
COOPERATION
The federal criminal justice system operates within the mathematical
construct of legislated mandatory minimum sentences and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.'43 Under mandatory sentencing structures, a court is
required to impose a specific mandatory term of incarceration, even if the
court believes that the sentence is unjust. A defendant's criminal conduct,
criminal history, and specific offense characteristics are assigned numerical
values. These numerical values are assigned certain presumptive sentenc-
ing consequences. Taken together, mandatory sentences and the guidelines
system impose both a statutory "floor" below which a court may not sen-
tence a defendant, and a presumptive range of incarceration within which
the court must usually sentence the defendant.'" However, the United
tific knowledge about those analyses gave defense counsel ample opportunity to conduct meaningful
cross-examination about the state's scientific conclusions. Id. at 228.
140 Ash, 413 U.S. at 311. This narrowing of the types of "stages" that were critical did not affect the
court's determination about the type of cases in which there was a right to counsel. Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee protected those charged with
misdemeanor cases if their conviction resulted in actual imprisonment. Argersinger is notable for its
consideration of counsel's role in plea bargaining. The Argersinger Court explicitly addressed the
prevalence of "assembly-line" plea bargaining in misdemeanor cases and recognized that a misdemeanor
defendant would need the "guiding hand of counsel" to help him decide whether to enter into a plea bar-
gain. Id. at 32.
141 Ash, 413 U.S. at 316. While some element of this inquiry had loomed in the Wade opinion,
Wade imagined that the critical stage determination would be fluid. For example, a legislative or policy
decision that altered police procedures might remedy the potential prejudice in the pretrial confrontation,
divesting that confrontation of the peril that had made it a critical stage. Wade, 388 U.S. at 239.
142 Ash, 413 U.S. at 311.
143 Mandatory and guidelines sentencing systems were enacted in many states during the 1980's and
1990's. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Cutting Edge of Sentencing Reform, 8 FED. SENTENCING R. 64 (1995).
This Article will focus on the interaction of mandatory and guidelines sentencing in the federal criminal
justice system.
144 Prior to the enactment of the sentencing guidelines, a United States District Court Judge had un-
fettered discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range. These judicial sentences were vir-
tually unreviewable. THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 1515
(2002); accord, 8A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 35.03[2] (3d ed. 2003)
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States Code also provides that cooperation with authorities establishes an
avenue to avoid compulsory sentencing.'45 This cooperation incentive adds
an additional twist to the new contexts in which right-to-counsel decisions
are made.46
A. Mandatory Sentencing
In general, the terms "mandatory sentencing" and "mandatory mini-
mum sentencing" refer to legislatively imposed minimum terms of incar-
ceration. In the federal system, mandatory sentences appear most often as
mandatory sentencing ranges (e.g., from zero to twenty years; from five to
forty years; from ten years to life).'47 These mandatory sentences are trig-
gered only when a prosecutor files an indictment alleging the requisite
statutory criteria and a defendant is convicted under that statute.
Mandatory minimum sentences have existed since the earliest days of
the United States. 4 ' However, mandatory sentencing remained rare
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Narcotics Control
Act of 1956 represented Congress' first attempt to adopt a comprehensive
mandatory sentencing structure. That act was perceived as a dismal failure
and Congress repealed the statute in 1970.149
In 1984, Congress again enacted a mandatory sentencing scheme. This
statutory construct was intended primarily to fight the "war on drugs" but
also included mandatory punishments for gun crimes. For two decades,
Congress has continued to expand the number and reach of mandatory sen-
tences. Today, mandatory sentences in the federal system are a prominent
(noting that prior to the sentencing guidelines "illegal sentences [were] essentially only those which ex-
ceed[ed] the relevant statutory maximum or violate[d] double jeopardy or [were] ambiguous or inter-
nally contradictory").
145 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000). The so-called 'safety valve' provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 cre-
ate a limited exception to the mandatory minimum sentences for certain first time offenders who do not
cooperate but who have 'truthfully provided to the Government all information the defendant has con-
cerning the same offense or offenses." Id. § 3553(0(5). This 'safety valve' is limited to non-violent
participants who lack any leadership role in the offense. Id. § 3553(f)(2), (4). The safety valve's provi-
sion of information clause is distinguished from cooperation inasmuch as the safety valve rewards can-
dor, whereas cooperation rewards success in providing substantial assistance.
146 See infra Part II.C.
147 Mandatory sentencing may occur in several circumstances: as a result of conviction under cer-
tain statutory provisions (all convictions under a particular statute carry a fixed sentence); as a result of
conviction under one part of a statutory scheme (convictions for drug trafficking carry different manda-
tory minimum sentences based upon the quantity of drugs distributed); or as a consequence of the status
of the victim or the defendant (repeat offenders face enhanced mandatory minimum sentences).
148 In 1790, the United States punished some crimes with a mandatory death sentence. U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1991) (citing I Stat. 112, 113 (1790)). Some of these manda-
tory death penalties were later amended so that the minimum sentence was life in prison and the maxi-
mum sentence was death. Id.
149 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-774 (1956) (repealed 1970).
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feature of the statutory structure and prosecutors routinely select charges
that carry mandatory sentences.'50
B. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act was a watershed in the practice of
federal sentencing. 5' The Act created the United States Sentencing Com-
mission ("Commission") to promulgate a sentencing system that would
promote honesty in sentencing, eliminate sentencing disparity, and ensure
the proportionality in sentencing. 5 ' That sentencing system is known as the
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").
Under the Guidelines, sentences are prescribed in terms of sentencing
ranges, for example from forty-six to fifty-seven months. Sentencing
ranges are calculated on a chart. The vertical axis represents the offense
level as calculated in accordance with instructions that measure offense se-
verity, offender conduct, and special victim-related factors. The horizontal
axis measures the defendant's criminal history. Determination of the of-
fense level and the criminal history category is itself a complex process re-
quiring multiple decisions about factual matters, such as the defendant's
role in the offense, which are weighed incrementally. The court determines
the two key values, offense level and criminal history, and the court plots
those values on the sentencing guideline chart. Their intersection results in
a presumptive range of time for which the offender should be incarcerated.
Judges have limited discretion to depart from these guidelines and any de-
partures must be justified on the record.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines prescribe sentences based
upon both the crime, as well as actual relevant conduct. The relevant con-
duct guideline'53 requires that "all acts, omissions committed, aided and
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured or willfully caused by
the defendant" be counted toward the offense level.'54 The Commission
also defines relevant conduct to include "all reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions by others in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activ-
ity."'55 As a result, criminal activity not covered by the specific statutory
ISO U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 148, at 11; Jed S. Rakoff, Four Postulates of White Col-
lar Practice, 1993 N.Y. L.J. 3; Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecu-
torial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1995).
151 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000).
152 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA3 (2002). The Sentencing Reform Act is a subsec-
tion of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The Commission's powers and responsibilities
are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 58 (2000). The statutory description of how guideline sentencing is to be
implemented is found in 18 U.S.C. § 27 (2000).
153 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2002).
154 Id. § IBI.3(a)(1)(A).
155 ld. § I BI.3(a) (1)(B).
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charge may nevertheless form the basis for an increased guidelines sen-
tence.'56
Because judges have no discretion in imposing mandatory sentences and
limited discretion in imposing guidelines sentences, prosecutorial charging
decisions dictate sentencing results and consequently become powerful tools
for plea bargaining.'57 Absent a substantial assistance motion by the prosecu-
tor, '58 guidelines results cannot trump mandatory sentences.
Parties can also bargain over guidelines issues; however, these bar-
gains do not bind probation officers or judges.'59 Guidelines plea agree-
ments can take many forms and the parties can bargain about variables such
as offense conduct, offender behavior, relevant conduct, victim characteris-
tics, and criminal history. 6° These guidelines sentence agreements gener-
ally fall into two categories: guideline recommendation agreements and
fact stipulation agreements. In a guidelines recommendation agreement, the
prosecutor promises to recommend to the court that the defendant be sen-
tenced within a particular guidelines range, or to a particular point within
the applicable range, or to a precise number of months. The defendant may
also persuade the prosecutor to recommend that the court make particular
findings with respect to controversial guidelines questions likely to arise at
the sentence proceeding. Because a government recommendation cannot
bind either the probation officer or the judge, guidelines recommendation
agreements rarely result in sentences outside of normal guideline proce-
dures. 6' Alternatively, the parties may bargain to obtain stipulated facts
relevant to the guideline calculation. Again, such stipulations do not pre-
vent a probation officer from challenging their accuracy, or the court from
making a different factual finding. Finally, the parties may bargain over the
benefits a defendant may receive by cooperating with authorities.
156 For example, if a defendant is charged with the sale of one ounce of crack cocaine, the defen-
dant's offense level calculation begins with a "base offense level" of twenty-one to twenty-seven
months. If, however, the court finds that the defendant sold that same packet of drugs for an organiza-
tion that sells more than fifty grams of cocaine base, the defendant's base offense level carries a guide-
lines range of 121-151 months. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1.
157 In some situations, the court may impose a federal sentence that is lower than the prescribed
statutory mandatory minimum. These cases occur if the government moves to reduce a defendant's sen-
tence under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.0 (2002) or FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 in recogni-
tion of a defendant's substantial assistance. Alternatively, a first-time offender may be eligible for a
statutory "safety valve" that enables the court to sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence.
158 Cooperation is discussed infra Part II.C.
159 However, parties can negotiate a binding sentence agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 l(e)(1)(C).
In that type of plea agreement, if the judge refuses to impose the agreed-upon sentence, the defendant
can withdraw his guilty plea.
160 PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 7-6, 7-17 (Phylis Skloot Bamberger
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2000).
161 Id. at 7-17.
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C. Cooperation as an Alternative to Mandatory and Guidelines Sentencing
By statute, cooperation with authorities is now a central feature of
criminal procedure. Upon the motion of the United States Attorney's Of-
fice, a district court judge can sentence a cooperating defendant to a term of
imprisonment below the applicable guidelines 162 and below any applicable
mandatory minimum sentence.'63 Alternatively, the government can file a
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim P. 35(b). Thereafter, the judge can reduce
a previously imposed sentence to a level below either the guidelines range
or any mandatory minimum sentence, in order to reflect substantial assis-
tance rendered or realized after the original sentence."6 Although providing
information in exchange for leniency is an old practice, 6 ' mandatory and
guidelines sentences make "the stick.., far heavier ... and the car-
rot ... larger. 
' 166
Unlike other plea agreements, a cooperation agreement only requires
the prosecution to make vague and largely unenforceable promises about
sentence outcomes. 167  The defendant promises to provide complete and
truthful information. The defendant also agrees to disclose all past criminal
activities. Further, the defendant agrees to testify in grand jury or trial pro-
ceedings and, when asked, to participate in monitored telephone conversa-
tions or engage in other surveillance-type activities, such as wearing a wire.
The agreement also requires the defendant to agree to postpone his sentence
until his cooperation is deemed complete.'68
In exchange, the government makes only one promise: if the defen-
dant provides substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
another individual, the prosecution will make a motion to the sentencing
judge for a reduction of the defendant's sentence. 169  Several caveats, and
162 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K 1.1 (2002).
163 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
164 FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). As will be discussed infra Part IlI.C, there are some restrictions on the
timing and extent of Rule 35 departures.
165 As described in the so-called Whisky cases, English common law permitted a suspect to inform
against his accomplice; if the accomplice was convicted, the informer would receive a pardon. United
States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878). Immunity from prosecution in exchange for cooperation was a
common feature of nineteenth century criminal practice in the United States. Id. (describing immunity
as a reward for cooperation as an "established usage").
166 Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 86 (1995).167 The description of cooperation agreements is based not only upon my years of practice in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, but also my review of cooperation agreements during the
two years that I spent as a Visiting Professor at Washington and Lee Law School. There I supervised
the Alderson Legal Assistance Program, a clinic that assisted the women incarcerated at the Federal
Prison Camp in Alderson, West Virginia. In that capacity, I reviewed cooperation agreements entered
into by women who had been prosecuted in districts all across the country.
168 This is the proverbial "Sword of Damocles" hanging over the defendant's head.
169 If the motion is made at sentence, it is made pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
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even an explicit threat, accompany this promise. First and foremost, the
government is to be the sole judge of whether the defendant has truthfully
and completely cooperated. The decision as to whether the cooperation
rises to the level of substantial assistance will be left to the sole discretion
of the prosecutor's office. 7 Often a cooperation agreement does not spec-
ify the extent of the departure the government will request. 7' And, even if
it did, that request would not be binding upon the sentencing court. Finally,
if the defendant fails to perform under the terms of the agreement, the
prosecutor's office retains the right to use the defendant's statements
against him at a subsequent prosecution for false statements.
Ultimately, the cooperation agreement is a gamble, in which the defen-
dant assumes the risk. The parties expect the defendant's sentence to be
tempered by the court's eventual ruling.'72 But, if the cooperation comes to
naught, or if the government deems the defendant's cooperation insubstan-
tial, a defendant has no right to withdraw his plea, and he suffers the full
penalties prescribed by law. The prosecutor's exclusive determination of
whether the defendant has provided substantial assistance is unassailable
unless the defendant can show that the government withheld the promised
motion for unconstitutional reasons. 173
III. LEARNING FROM EXAMPLES: How APPLYING THE
CRITICAL STAGE DOCTRINE TO CONTEMPORARY PROCEDURE
CREATES UNFAIR RESULTS
This part of the Article challenges the wisdom of the critical stage doc-
trine by showing how its application to contemporary stages of criminal
prosecutions creates unfairness. The critical stage doctrine cannot guarantee
a meaningful right to counsel when its rigid and narrow criteria are applied
to new and non-traditional stages in a criminal prosecution. As to each ex-
ample, this Article first explains the contemporary practice that creates the
right-to-counsel dilemma. Then, using examples culled both from reported
170 See Richman, supra note 166, at 102 n. 114.
171 See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501,
532 (1992) (noting that in one of the three districts examined by the authors, prosecutors made a promise
about a specific sentence); United States v. Robert, 5 F.3d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1993) (plea agreement
promises that if defendant provides substantial assistance, government will recommend that the court cut
the guidelines sentence in half); United States v. Jimenez, 992 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir. 1993) (plea
agreement promises that if defendant provides substantial assistance, the government will request a
twenty-five percent reduction in the guidelines range). For a discussion of the strategic benefits of de-
liberately vague promises, see Richman, supra note 166, at 96-97.
172 For a discussion comparing traditional plea-bargaining with cooperation bargaining, see Rich-
man, supra note 166, at 93.
173 Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 182-83 (1992). Some lower courts have also held that the
government has an obligation to act in "good faith." See, e.g., United State v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710,
714 (2d Cir. 1990).
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and unreported cases, this Article demonstrates how in these new situations
the critical stage doctrine fails contemporary criminal defendants.
Subpart A examines the phenomenon of pre-charge bargaining in
which adversary positions solidify and plea bargaining ensues long before
formal adversary proceedings begin. Subpart B explores the tremendous
importance of presentence interview as a confrontation that may have ir-
revocable consequences for plea and sentencing outcomes. Finally, subpart
C takes a closer look at the phenomenon of government cooperation and the
federal procedure for sentencing reductions that makes an otherwise "col-
lateral" proceeding the true imposition of sentence.
A. Pre-Charge Bargaining
Plea bargaining generally involves negotiating a resolution to a case in
which a prosecutor or grand jury has already filed charges.'74 In pre-charge
bargaining, the parties negotiate to determine what charges the prosecutor
will file.
In the federal system, if pre-charge bargaining is successful, the parties
agree that the defendant will waive her right to a grand jury indictment and
the United States Attorney will file a criminal information alleging the vio-
lation of an agreed-upon statute.'75 The defendant pleads guilty to the in-
formation and is sentenced accordingly.'76 For reasons discussed below,
when pre-charge bargaining is unsuccessful, the negotiations may lead to
the prosecutor filing charges that are more serious than those she had previ-
ously contemplated. Unsuccessful pre-charge bargaining may provide the
prosecutor with otherwise undiscoverable evidence that she may use to
convict the defendant at trial or to enhance the defendant's sentence.
1. Pre-Charge Bargaining in Contemporary Procedure.-While
mandatory sentencing and the United States Sentencing Guidelines have in-
creased the importance and prevalence of all types of plea bargaining, they
174 Typically, plea bargaining means that the defendant agrees to plead guilty and give up his right
to trial. In return, the prosecutor agrees to drop certain charges or to agree to a particular sentence. See
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1921 (1992).
175 For further discussion of the merits of waiving indictment, see Plato Cacheris, Responsibilities of
a Criminal Defense Attorney, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 33 (1996). Alternatively, the parties may agree that
the defendant will plead guilty to a particular charge; the prosecutor then presents that charge to a grand
jury. This practice is generally used when the defendant is cooperating with authorities and the parties
wish to keep that cooperation secret. Parties may also resort to charge bargaining when a defendant has
provided truthful information but that information has not substantially assisted authorities or when the
parties agree that the sentencing judge is unlikely to award a sentencing discount that the parties feel is
merited. For speculation about the statistical correlation between low substantial assistance rates and
high charge bargaining rates in some federal districts, see Daniel Richman, The Challenges of Investi-
gating Section 5K].1 in Practice, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 75 (1998).
176 This type of plea bargaining reflects that "as is often true in the criminal justice system" a defen-
dant may be "less concerned with the proof of her guilt or innocence than with the severity of her pun-
ishment." Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999).
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have created a particularly powerful incentive to engage in pre-charge bar-
gaining.'77 Although the guidelines attempt to limit the consequences of
charge bargaining, mandatory minimum sentences and overlapping statu-
tory provisions make charge bargaining and pre-charge bargaining the most
effective way of limiting penal consequences. "[B]y deciding what to
charge, how to charge, and what aggravating factors to present or withhold,
the United States Attorney knows... what sentence he wishes to impose
and what sentence will in fact be imposed."'' If defense counsel can influ-
ence the charging decision, she can mitigate the sentence.
However, charge bargaining is only part of the pre-charge negotiations
in the federal system. Guidelines can profoundly alter the intended conse-
quences of a charging agreement. Whereas a mandatory minimum sentence
still exposes the defendant to a wide range of sentencing possibilities, lim-
ited only by the statutory maximum sentence, guidelines prescribe a far
more precise range.'79 When the statute of conviction exposes the defendant
to a long term of imprisonment, guidelines plea bargains can limit the de-
fendant's exposure, thereby blunting the sting of the statutory maximum.
Conversely, when the guidelines prescribe a lengthy term of incarceration,
prosecution under a statute with a relatively short maximum sentence will
cap the guidelines at the statutory maximum, thereby blunting the guide-
177 David N. Yellen, Two CheersforA Tale of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1992)
(noting that guidelines have increased pre-indictment charge bargaining); accord WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 102, at 983-93 ("Because the federal sentencing guidelines provide an incentive to en-
gage in pre-indictment plea bargaining, it is not surprising that a considerable amount of such bargaining
now occurs."); see also PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 160, at
7-26 (arguing pre-indictment plea negotiations are more likely to result in a successful charge agree-
ment). Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that after prosecutors indict, only two percent of defen-
dants successfully bargain for a plea to an offense that carries a lesser mandatory minimum sentence
than those required by the offenses charged in the indictment. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N,
supra note 148, at 44. Prosecutors also charge defendants under the highest mandatory minimum sen-
tence warranted by the alleged offense in approximately three quarters of all cases. Id.
178 United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637 (E.D. Wash. 1990) (McNichols, C.J.); see also
United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1367-68 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd sub nom, United States v.
Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
[T]he real allocution now takes place in the back rooms of the U.S. Attorney's Office where [a
prosecutor] decides on such subjects as whether to charge the defendant with a five-year or
twenty-year felony; whether to indict on a count calling for a consecutive sentence, or one without
such a requirement; whether to include in the record, or not, that the defendant had a weapon at the
time of the offense; and the like.
United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 896 (1991); accord Steven J.
Schulhofer & Ilene J. Nagel, Plea Bargaining Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 218, 219 (1991) ("In a guidelines system, whoever controls the relevant facts and
charges controls the sentence.") (emphasis added). For an insightful discussion about the policy issues
raised by wide-ranging prosecutorial discretion, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV 505 (2001).
179 Ifa Guidelines analysis prescribes a sentence that falls above or below the statutory mandatory
minimum or maximum sentences, the statutory limits will control and the Guidelines sentence will only
by applied to the extent that it conforms with statutory limitations.
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lines' impact. Therefore, bargaining about sentencing guidelines can also
enhance the parties' abilities to make accurate predictions about the sen-
tence most likely to be imposed.
So, how does pre-charge bargaining happen? What is the procedure?
The answers vary from case to case. Federal pre-charge bargaining is an
entirely extra-judicial and unregulated process. 8 ' Some pre-charge bargain-
ing occurs between prosecutors and unrepresented defendants because the
execution of a search warrant or the "word on the street" suggests to the de-
fendant that law enforcement wants to talk to him. In white-collar cases,
some pre-charge bargaining is initiated by attorneys.' However, unsophis-
ticated attorneys may be unaware of the procedural intricacies of the federal
system and may, therefore, not understand the import and the urgency of
pre-charge bargaining and cooperation.
When experienced federal criminal defense practitioners are involved,
pre-charge negotiations reflect an awareness of the defendant's rights and
calculated decisions about whether and how to waive those rights. The ne-
gotiations thus occur on a somewhat level playing field: each side is repre-
sented by a skilled and trained professional who recognizes and addresses
the risks and rewards that this process entails.8 2 These pre-charge negotia-
tions may include complex defense presentations to prosecutors, at which
defense attorneys argue for lesser charges or no charges at all.'83 Defense
attorneys present evidence that might otherwise be unobtainable by the
prosecution; they proffer facts about the case or offer statements by the de-
fendant who might otherwise have claimed Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination. Moreover, defense counsel do so under standard
"proffer" agreements that limit the government's future use of any state-
ment a defendant makes during a negotiation session. t"4 Negotiations can
180 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FDMLR 2117, 2118
(1998).
181 "Sophisticated defense counsel know that their opportunity to argue innocence or their opportu-
nity to argue leniency" arises in these informal pre-charge negotiations. Daniel C. Richman, Panel Dis-
cussion: The Expanding Prosecutorial Role From Trial Counsel to Investigator and Administrator, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 679, 684 (1999). Judge Lynch suggests that many defense attorneys are ignorant of
these procedures because the "education and training of lawyers is not about this phantom accusatory
system in which everybody is going to go to trial, and everything important happens in court." Id. at
696; accord Cacheris, supra note 175, at 99.
182 However, as will be explained infra Part Il.C, if defense counsel fails to adequately protect her
client, the client has no recourse.
183 Cacheris, supra note 175, at 107.
184 Proffer agreements, often called "Queen-for-a-Day" agreements, grant a type of "use" immunity
to statements made during the proffer. However, prosecutors generally write the agreements in a man-
ner that permits them to use the proffered statements to pursue investigative leads, to impeach the sus-
pect (should he later testify), and/or to enhance the sentencing guidelines range at the conclusion of the
suspect's criminal prosecution. These agreements may be short-lived agreements or may be part of an
overall plea agreement. For a discussion of these agreements, see Graham Hughes, Agreements for Co-
operation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 (1992).
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also address the production of documents, the timing or limitation of sub-
poena compliance, restitution, or cooperation in the prosecution of others.
However, when uncounselled individuals negotiate with prosecutors or
when inexperienced attorneys get involved, the situation is entirely differ-
ent. Once an uncounselled, targeted individual meets with prosecutors or
law enforcement, his fate will depend entirely upon the integrity of his ad-
versary. An individual who does not understand the complexities of the
federal sentencing system may not know for what benefit he should bar-
gain. A defendant is unlikely to know enough to ask for proffer protections.
If he does receive a proffer agreement, it is unlikely that he will understand
its complexities. If pre-charge bargaining fails, the defendant may well
have sealed his fate at trial by providing statements and evidence that will
guarantee his conviction.'85 And the defendant's admissions of criminal
conduct will be used to increase his guidelines calculation.'86 Defendants
who negotiate directly with the prosecution rarely understand the risks they
face: statements and evidence that they provide in the course of negotia-
tions frequently become the weapons the prosecution uses to convict them
after negotiations turn sour.
Pre-charge bargaining in the federal system has an extra dimension that
adds to its importance in determining outcomes: cooperation with law en-
forcement. As noted earlier, the provision of "substantial assistance" is of-
ten the only way for a defendant to reduce his sentence below both
guidelines ranges and mandatory sentences.'87 However, the requirement
that a defendant provide substantial assistance means that a defendant's in-
formation must be useful. A defendant who cooperates with authorities af-
ter all of his coconspirators have already cooperated or pled guilty does not
provide substantial assistance, regardless of his candor in confessing and
naming names. 88 As a result, many defense attorneys advise their clients to
provide substantial assistance before formal adversary proceedings have
begun so that they can win the race to the courthouse door.'89
An agreement to cooperate requires delicate negotiations. The process
moves forward through a series of "auditions" that test the likelihood of the
defendant's successful performance. 98 Successful cooperation generally
185 A defendant may effectively be bound to the version of events he provides. Cacheris, supra note
175, at 102.
186 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.8 (2002).
187 Sentence reductions can occur at the sentence, pursuant to § 5K1.l of the Guidelines. Alterna-
tively, the Court can resentence a defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3551.
188 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. 1, cmt. background (2002).
189 Cooperation negotiations can begin in a variety of ways. A defendant can contact the govern-
ment, directly offering information in exchange for charging and sentencing benefits. Some soon-to-be
defendants reach out in response to government signals that they may soon be arrested. Other defen-
dants seek such self-help measures following their convictions.
190 First, the prosecutor will set up a proffer meeting. The purpose of this meeting is to determine whether
a cooperation agreement seems likely. A standard Queen-for-a-Day agreement offers the defendant limited
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requires the defendant to "provide truthful, complete and accurate informa-
tion" to the government.'' In exchange, the government agrees to file a
motion asking the district court to reduce the defendant's sentence so long
as the defendant provides substantial assistance.'92 It is a standard feature of
these cooperation agreements that the government's "determination of
whether the defendant has cooperated fully and provided substantial assis-
tance, and [its] assessment of the value, truthfulness, completeness and ac-
curacy of the cooperation" is binding upon the defendant.'93
Moreover, cooperation and full disclosure carry sentencing risks, risks
that may be hidden from the unrepresented individual. For example, be-
cause guidelines sentences are based upon "relevant conduct," a candid ad-
mission by a cooperator may form the basis for a severe sentencing
enhancement.' In negotiated cooperation, many defense attorneys obtain
for their clients a cooperation agreement that limits the ways in which the
government can use information volunteered by the defendant as part of his
cooperation."' Absent such an agreement, sentence-enhancing information
provided by a defendant can and will be used to calculate his guidelines
range.'96 With or without counsel, despite their strong motivation to reduce
their sentences, cooperating defendants struggle to give candid responses to
government questioning. The risks inherent in any cooperation debriefing
are exacerbated when a defendant is unprepared for the proffer and lacks
experienced counsel to assist him. The government's questions may con-
fuse a cooperator who may be too nervous or too unsophisticated to under-
stand what information the government is seeking.97 Intimidated by the
interview process, a cooperator may not always focus on his best interests;
after all, the uncounselled defendant knows only that the government,
which arrested him (or has threatened to do so), is now asking him to an-
swer incriminating questions. The cooperating defendant has a complex
and confusing relationship with prosecutors and law enforcement."' On the
one hand, the government seems to be offering him a place, of sorts, on the
government team. On the other hand, the defendant and the government
protection against the use of his statements at trial. If the proffer suggests that further negotiations are war-
ranted, the prosecutor generally prepares a draft of a proposed cooperation agreement.
t91 United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1996).
192 Id.
'93 Id.
194 PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 160, at 7-15, 7-17.
195 Id. at 7-17 (citing to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §lBl.8). Statements made to the
government without the protection of a cooperation agreement will be used to enhance a defendant's
guidelines range. Id.
196 Id. (citing to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.8(b)(5)); see also, e.g., United States
v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on proffer to increase guidelines sentence when defendant
proffered information to government but ultimately did not enter into cooperation agreement).
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have fundamentally adverse interests and, if negotiations break down, the
government can withdraw its promised help and protection. In that event,
litigation about those failed negotiations will pit the unrepresented defen-
dant against the full weight of the government: it will be his word against
the word of prosecutors and law enforcement.'99
Under the critical stage doctrine, the right to counsel attaches only "at
or after the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment." Therefore, by definition, pre-charge bargaining occurs prior to the
time when the right to counsel attaches under the Kirby rule. However, the
modem machinery of criminal prosecution is so finely developed that it is
often "a mere formality" that the government has yet to indict a defen-
dant."' Pre-indictment negotiations are increasingly common;2 ' yet, the
rigid critical stage doctrine means that there is a blanket rule that no right to
counsel inheres in these proceedings no matter how concretely adversary
they really are.
In order to illustrate the problem, this Article examines the reported
decision of the Sixth Circuit in Moody v. United States."2 As will be shown
below, this type of bright-line critical stage doctrine cannot guarantee fair
process or fair results. Pre-charge bargaining is an important aspect of ef-
fective advocacy. When the government has committed itself to prosecut-
ing an individual and its failure to file formal charges is a mere formality, a
defendant should have the right to the assistance of counsel.
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 2000). There are other pre-
indictment procedures one might use to demonstrate how the bright-line Kirby rule fails to honor the
Sixth Amendment's promise. The issue also arises in other types of pre-charge investigations. See
United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112 (1Oth Cir. 1998) (no Sixth Amendment violation
where, prior to indictment, investigating agents seized confidential attorney-client privileged docu-
ments); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (no Sixth Amendment violation when,
prior to indictment, government tape recorded conversations of suspect who had retained counsel in
connection with government investigation); United States v. Watson, 871 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(government conditions cooperation agreement upon uncounselled cooperator's agreement to waive as-
sistance of counsel); Sabatier v. Dabrowski, 586 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1978) (no right to counsel at extradi-
tion proceedings); McDonald v. Burrows, 731 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); Caltagirone v. Grant,
629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F.Supp. 184 (D. Nev. 1980) (same); Judd v.
Vose, 813 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1987) (reasoning that Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
while extradited defendant is en route to extraditing state unless state has formally charged him); United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (no Sixth Amendment right to counsel during grand jury pro-
ceedings because formal charges had not yet been filed). For a discussion of the right to counsel follow-
ing the removal of cases from tribal courts, see United States v. Percy, 250 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir. 2001)
(suggesting no Sixth Amendment violation when federal agents interview an uncounselled defendant
after his tribal court arraignment on charges "inextricably intertwined" with those being investigated by
the federal agents).
201 Moody, 206 F.3d at 611.
202 Id. at 615.
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2. Moody's Blues.-Mark Moody was a cocaine dealer.2 °3 While in-
vestigating a large cocaine conspiracy, the FBI obtained and executed
search warrants for Moody's home and his business.2"4 When the FBI exe-
cutes a search warrant, any intelligent individual understands that an arrest
is more than likely; Moody was no exception. After the FBI searched his
home and business, Moody read the writing on the wall and went to the FBI
to offer his cooperation. 5 Moody was unrepresented for almost two
months while he met with FBI agents and federal prosecutors. In those
meetings, Moody provided the FBI with significant information. Previ-
ously, the FBI recovered only one kilogram of cocaine linked to Moody and
his coconspirators. 6 Moody provided the FBI with proof that the conspir-
acy dealt in more than 12 kilograms of cocaine.2 7
The prosecutor proposed a plea bargain: Moody would continue to co-
operate and would testify at any trial of his coconspirators. In exchange,
the government would charge Moody under a statute that carried a maxi-
mum sentence of five years (sixty months) of incarceration.2 8 Moody re-
tained counsel to advise him about the merits of the plea agreement. 209 His
attorney rejected the offer without even inquiring about the evidence that
Moody had provided to the FBI.2"'
Thereafter, the government indicted Moody and charged him with con-
spiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846.21 1 As a result, Moody
faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years (120 months) and a
guidelines sentence that would reflect the government's evidence that
Moody's relevant conduct included eighteen kilograms of cocaine. 2




207 Id. at611 n.1.
208 This proposed plea agreement is an excellent example of how charge bargaining can cap a de-
fendant's sentence exposure, thereby blunting the consequences of the sentencing guidelines. When the
prosecution made this offer, Moody's sentencing guidelines exposure was well over 120 months of in-
carceration. (Absent any adjustment for criminal history, role in the offense or offense enhancement, the
base offense level for twelve kilograms of cocaine begins at 121-151 months.) The most applicable
statutes of conviction would have been 21 U.S.C. § 846 or § 841, each carries a minimum sentence of
120 months and a maximum sentence of life. By offering Moody a charge with a five year maximum,
the prosecutor effectively removed the statutory risk and eliminated the guidelines as a serious source of
sentence enhancement. The five-year statutory maximum was the key to this proposed bargain; had the
prosecutor offered Moody a plea to 21 U.S.C. § 841(C), which carries a statutory minimum of zero and
a maximum of twenty years (240 months), Moody would have been exposed to a guidelines sentence of
up to the statutory maximum of 240 months.
209 Moody, 206 F.3d at 611.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 This increased his guidelines offense level by eight points; from a level twenty-six for one kilo-
gram of cocaine, to a level of thirty-four for eighteen kilograms of cocaine. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2002).
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Moody pleaded guilty and the court found that the applicable sentencing
guidelines range was 235-293 months of incarceration." 3 Based on
Moody's substantial assistance, the government moved for a downward de-
parture to a sentence of 168 months."' The district court departed even fur-
ther and imposed a sentence of 120 months of incarceration." 5
Not surprisingly, Moody felt that his attorney had provided him inef-
fective assistance. After all, by following his attorney's advice, Moody had
more than quadrupled his guidelines sentencing exposure (from five years
to more than twenty years) and had increased his maximum statutory sen-
tence from five years to life. Moreover, Moody's statutory mandatory
minimum sentence of ten years was twice as long as the maximum sentence
he faced under the prosecution's first offer.
On collateral attack, Moody alleged that he had received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel during his plea negotiations.2 6 The district court evalu-
ated the question of ineffective assistance under the two-part Strickland test:
to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove
that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness; and (2) the deficient performance caused actual prejudice that
produced an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome."' The court con-
cluded that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of rea-
sonableness. 2" As to the prejudice prong, the court held, "but for [his
counsel's] ineffective assistance, Moody would not have rejected the gov-
ernment's first offer of a plea agreement. 219 Moreover, Moody had "suf-
fered prejudice by his subsequent exposure to a substantially higher
sentence. 2 ' Accordingly, the district court vacated the judgment and re-
sentenced Moody as if he had pleaded guilty under terms of the original
plea offer.22" '
On appeal, the government did not argue that Moody's counsel had
provided effective assistance.22 Because counsel's prejudicial errors oc-
213 Moody, 206 F.3d at 611.
214 Id.
215 Id. Although the opinion is unclear, it appears that the government motion was for a departure
under § 5Kl.1 of the Guidelines and not under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Therefore, the district court could
not impose a sentence of less than ten years. Moody, 206 F.3d at 612. After his sentence, Moody con-
tinued to cooperate with the prosecution and he testified at the trial of one of the drug suppliers. Id. The
opinion is silent as to whether Moody anticipated receiving or actually did receive a subsequent depar-
ture downward pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
216 Moody made other claims not relevant to this Article. They are discussed at Moody, 206 F.3d at
612.
217 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
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curred before Moody had been formally charged, the ineffective assistance
occurred before the right to counsel had attached; the government argued
therefore that the ineffective assistance had no constitutional significance.
Thus, Moody had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel and no remedy for
the substantial prejudice caused by his lawyer's abysmal performance.
Looking at the Supreme Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence, the
Sixth Circuit felt bound to honor the Court's bright line rule that there is no
right to counsel until formal adversary proceedings have begun. 23 Accord-
ingly, the Sixth Circuit reluctantly concluded that Moody had no Sixth
Amendment claim. The Sixth Circuit's opinion illustrated both the absurd-
ity and the tragedy in applying the old critical stage analysis to the new re-
alities of criminal procedure.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that there was a clear adversariness-
in-fact between Moody and the prosecution: "Moody was faced with an
expert prosecutorial adversary," who had clearly "commit[ed] himself to
proceed with prosecution." '224 That proposed bargain was "a formalized of-
fer" reflecting the reality of the situation: it was a "mere formality that the
government had not indicted Moody." '225 Because the prosecution had en-
gaged in "formal plea negotiations," and offered "a specific sentence ... for
a specific offense," it was clear that "the adverse positions of the govern-
ment and the suspect [had] solidified." '226 The Sixth Circuit also noted the
complexity of the issues confronting Moody. He was asked to consider "a
plea bargain which he needed legal expertise to evaluate." '227
Under those circumstances, the Sixth Circuit correctly observed that it
was "a triumph of the letter over the spirit of the law to hold that Moody
had no right to counsel.., only because the government had not yet filed
formal charges." '228 The Court's holding forced the "ponderable realization
that this is an occasion when justice must of necessity yield to the rule of
law .. "229
223 Id. at 613 (referring to United States v. Gouviea, 467 U.S. 180, 193 (1984) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986)).
224 Moody, 206 F.3d at 614.
225 Id. at 615.
226 Id. at 613.
227 Id.
228 Id. Because Moody's case involves plea bargaining, the results seem particularly unjust and out
of step with Supreme Court jurisprudence that has long recognized a right to counsel during the plea
bargaining process. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (Sixth Amendment entitles defendant to
right to effective assistance of counsel in plea proceedings); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970) (suggesting that defendant has right to counsel in evaluating benefit of waiving trial and pleading
guilty); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (requiring counsel to advise defendant how to
"plead intelligently").
229 Moody, 206 F.3d at 616.
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B. Changes in the Importance of the Presentence Investigation and the
Presentence Interview
In the guidelines sentencing system, the presentence report is central to
federal criminal practice. Accordingly, the probation officer who authors
the report has an enlarged role in the sentencing process. These changes
have created a radical shift in the landscape of the sentencing procedure.
1. Changes in the Probation Officer's Role.-In the pre-guidelines
system, the presentence report described "the defendant's character or per-
sonality ... his or her problems or needs ... [and] his or her relationships
with people."23  The goal of this presentation was to help "the reader under-
stand the world in which the defendant lives."23' The presentence report
was emphatically not a prosecutorial resource for sentencing enhance-
ments." The defendant was the report's "primary source" and the Proba-
tion Department feared that a defendant's "candor and openness" might be
"stifled if the report is available for prosecutorial or investigative use." '233
As a result, the probation officer's role was advisory. The probation
officer served a social work function in the courthouse, assisting the court
in developing an individualized sentence that fit the offender, not the of-
fense. The probation officer did not make any "fact finding" decisions
about the crime committed. Rather, the probation officer had a limited in-
vestigative role. The probation officer did not decide whether the defendant
or the government had provided an accurate account of the offense. In-
stead, the probation officer wrote a presentence report that contained two
versions of the offense: one from the prosecution's point of view and the
other from the defendant's standpoint.3 Prior bad acts by the defendant,
such as drug abuse or undiscovered criminal conduct, were reported only if
they would help the court to understand a defendant's motivations or to
predict a defendant's possible future behavior.23 The probation officer's
approach to the defendant was a therapeutic one in which the officer, who
230 Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Pub. No. 105, The Presentence
Investigation Report 1 (1978).
231 Id.
232 According to the 1978 Probation Department monograph, "[p]rosecutorial use of a presentence
report is incompatible with the purpose of the report as a sentencing and correctional tool." Id. at 3.
233 Id. Prior to mandatory guidelines, sentencing probation officers had a long history of function-
ing as "specialized social worker[s]." As a result, the parties to a criminal case viewed the probation
officer as neutral or as an ally of the defendant seeking a more lenient rehabilitative sentence. Sharon
M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bed-
fellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 945 (1995).
234 Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Pub. No. 105, The Presentence
Investigation Report 6 (1978); see also Keith A. Findley & Meredith J. Ross, Comment, Access, Accu-
racy and Fairness: The Federal Presentence Investigation Report Under Julian and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 837, 843 n.28.
235 Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Pub. No. 105, The Presentence
Investigation Report 4 (1978).
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would later supervise the defendant's probation, began rehabilitative ef-
forts.
236
Now, under the federal sentencing guidelines, the probation officer is
the "keeper" of the sentencing system2 7 and the guardian of the guide-
lines.238 In this system, the probation makes a preliminary ruling about the
facts of the case239 and the applicable law.24 ° She does so by conducting a
mandatory presentence investigation and preparing a sentencing guidelines
report.24 Her presentence report may determine the defendant's sentence.242
It purports to describe the offense conduct and provides a corresponding
guideline calculation of the base offense level, specific offense characteris-
tics, victim-related enhancements, and criminal history. As will be dis-
cussed, infra, this report includes the probation officer's narrative as well as
subjective conclusions and analysis that supports the officer's sentencing
calculation.243 In the event of a proposed departure, the probation officer
recommends whether and to what extent the court should depart. The offi-
cer also recommends to the court where, within the applicable guidelines
range, the court should sentence the defendant.
This presentence report is radically different than those prepared in the
pre-guidelines era. The guidelines presentence report contains one "fac-
tual" description of the offense conduct, which is presented in a narrative
form that implies that the probation officer conducted independent re-
search.2" In fact, probation officers rarely conduct any independent inves-
236 The Probation Office anticipated that the interview itself "may have both a salutary and trau-
matic effect on the defendant. The crisis of the situation often brings about a reevaluation of the of-
fender's personal situation. Thus it is an excellent time to develop a positive atmosphere for the
subsequent supervisory relationship." Id.
237 Marcia Chambers, Probation Officers Sit in Judgment, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16, 1990, at 13.
238 Judy Clarke, Ruminations on Restrepo, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 135 (1989).
239 See Findley & Ross, supra note 234, at 859 (arguing that, under the guidelines system, accuracy
in the presentence report has a greater importance than it did in the pre-guidelines era).
240 Benjamin Coleman, In Defense of Hopper: The Burden of Prooffor Dramatic Increases Under
the Guidelines, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 225, 226 (2000) (arguing that the presentence report "be-
comes the centerpiece of the sentencing process[:] ... it becomes the preliminary findings of the court").
241 A defendant cannot waive the presentence report. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1 (2002). The Court can decline to order a presentence report but must put
its reasons on the record. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(1); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6AI.I
(2002).
242 Some probation officers describe their guidelines role as that of a "punisher." Harry Joe Jaffe,
The Presentence Report, Probation Officer Accountability, and Recruitment Practices: Some Influences
of Guidelines Sentencing, 53 FED. PROBATION 12 (1989).
243 United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1996).
244 See, e.g., Findley & Ross, supra note 234, at 859 (citing Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sen-
tencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1656-58 (1980)). Information provided by the government and reported by the
Probation Officer often includes damning and conclusory statements about the defendant as a "major
drug dealer" or "organized crime member." Id. As a former federal defender and as former director of a
clinic that assisted women in federal prison, I have reviewed hundreds of presentence reports. In my
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tigation into the facts of the offense. Rather, the description of the offense
often reflects "factual" information excerpted exclusively from the prosecu-
tor's files. 45
After conducting her investigation, the probation officer adds and sub-
tracts guidelines numbers, calculating criminal history, offense adjustments,
role adjustments, and enhancements based on post-arrest conduct (such as
acceptance of responsibility or obstruction of justice). If the prosecution
and defense have entered into guidelines stipulations or recommendation
agreements, the probation officer is free to disagree and even to advocate
for a different result than the one the parties jointly desire.
Careful attorneys do legal research on guidelines issues so that they
can present their guidelines arguments to the probation officer before the
officer drafts the presentence report and takes a position on the guide-
lines.246 After all, "[i]t is far more difficult to dislodge a conclusion formal-
ized by being written into a [presentence report] than it is to influence the
formation of that conclusion in the first place." '247
The probation officer must share her report with the parties within
thirty-five days of the scheduled sentence.248 The parties then have two
weeks to file written objections to the report. Counsel must review the pre-
sentence report with the defendant line-by-line because facts not denied will
be deemed admitted.249 Moreover, the federal rules permit district judges to
"adopt portions of the presentence report when making findings of fact un-
der the guidelines" without holding a hearing.250
If a party files an objection, the probation officer can meet with the
parties to discuss the objections,' or the officer can re-open the presen-
experience, the presentence report depicts the government's version of the offense as factual: "[tihis
officer spoke with the assigned Assistant United States Attorney and learned that the defendant's con-
duct involved... ". In contrast, the presentence report generally reports the defendant's account of the
offense conduct in more dubious terms: "[t]he defendant claims that her conduct... ".
245 This was my experience and the experience of many of my former colleagues in the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York. Commentators agree that the standard probation report relies heav-
ily, if not exclusively, upon the prosecutor's version of events. See, e.g., John M. Dick, Allowing Sen-
tence Bargains to Fall Outside of the Guidelines Without Valid Departures: It Is Time for the
Commission to Act, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1033 (1997). This practice is particularly unfair since
prosecutors may pick and choose which parts of their files they want to reveal to the probation officer;
prosecutors are under no obligation to share exculpatory material or mitigating information with the
probation officer.
246 Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Gustavo A. Gelpi, Federal Sentencing Advocacy: Tips for Beginning
Practitioners, II CRIM. JUST. 26, 29 (1997).
247 Bowman, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 188.
248 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(5)(A). Ordinarily, this disclosure will include the probation officer's
sentencing recommendation. However, either the court or the local rules may prohibit disclosure of the
recommendation. Id.
249 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b); Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 246, at 30.
250 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1).
251 Id. 32(b)(5)(B).
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tence investigation. By no later than one week before the sentencing, the
probation officer must provide the parties and the court with the final pre-
sentence report. 52 If the revised report has not resolved the contested mat-
ters, the probation officer prepares an addendum that describes outstanding
sentencing disputes and probation officer's factual and legal conclusions
about how the dispute should be resolved.
To resolve any remaining sentencing disputes, the court can hear ar-
gument and may take testimony about disputed factual matters.253  At the
sentence, the probation officer can assume a variety of roles. For example,
the officer may be a factual witness to a dispute about a statement made
during the presentence interview. The officer may participate in the legal
argument over the guidelines,254 or may speak privately with the judge about
factual or legal matters. 55 Some probation officers act as guidelines ex-
perts, consulting with the court at a sidebar conference that the parties can-
not attend. Some probation officers team up with the prosecution; officers
literally sit at the prosecutor's table.256
If the court resolves a sentencing dispute with a finding of fact that dif-
fers from the probation officer's conclusions, the court will amend the pre-
sentence report. Otherwise, the court adopts the presentence report as its
own findings of fact. Perhaps as a result of the probation officer's trans-
formation from a rehabilitation planner to sentence calculator, the probation
officer's relationship with defense counsel has changed. Whereas the pre-
guidelines relationship between defense counsel and probation officer was
"more amicable than adversarial," 257 now, defense attorneys are no longer
willing to speak frankly with probation officers. Many defense attorneys
view the probation officer as the prosecutor's ally who works "to review
and then raise the guideline calculations. 25s Some defense attorneys view
252 Id. 32(b)(5)(C).
253 Id.
254 See United States v. Govan, 152 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1998) (probation officer responds directly
to defense counsel's sentencing arguments); United States v. Montoya, 24 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 1994)
(probation officer cites to case law in advocating guidelines position); United States v. Sifuentez, 30
F.3d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir. 1994) (court cautions against probation officer straying from "analyzing de-
parture grounds to ... excessive and impermissible advocacy or argument").
255 For example, the probation officer may give a confidential sentencing recommendation to the
court. The court need not share that recommendation with the defendant. FED. R. CRIM P. 32(b)(6)(A);
United States v. West, 15 F.3d 119 (8th Cir. 1994) (court may keep recommendation confidential);
United States v. Humphrey, 154 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).
256 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 203 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).
257 Presumably, the same, or worse, might be said about the relationship between the defendant and
probation officer. Certainly, to the extent the guidelines system has increased "the adversarial dimen-
sion of the relationship between defense counsel and probation officers," it has also increased the adver-
sarial relationship and dangerous consequences of interactions between defendants and probation
officers. J. Vincent Romero, The Relationship Between Defense Counsel and the Probation Officer Un-
der the Guidelines, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 312, 1 (1999).
258 United States v. Washington, 146 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1998). In one case, a probation officer
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the probation officer as a junior prosecutor.259 Others view the probation of-
ficer as an advocate for the Commission and the guidelines system.26
2. The Critical Importance of the Presentence Interview.-In this
guidelines system, the presentence interview takes on new importance.
When parties appeal a sentence, the presentence report is often the most
important evidence of how and why a court erred. Before the guidelines,
the parties rarely, if ever, included the presentence report in the appellate
record;26" ' now, by law, the presentence report is a mandatory part of the re-
cord on appeal.262 Prior to the guidelines system, defense attorneys rarely
concerned themselves with the outcome of the presentence interview. Now,
the probation officer's interview of the defendant can have real and quanti-
fiable sentencing consequences.263 Some federal judges even alert defen-
dants at the end of a plea allocution about the probation officer's interview,
warning that "anything [you] say to the probation officer can be used
against [you] at sentencing."2"
caused law enforcement to create a new laboratory report in an effort. STITH & CABRANES, supra note
3, at 1260 (citing Jan Piotrowski, The Enhanced Role of the Probation Officer in the Sentencing Proc-
ess, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 1996-97 (1991)); see also Felicia Sarner, "Fact Bargaining" Under the
Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of the Probation Department, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 328 (1996).
259 The positions of the Probation Officer's Advisory Group ("POAG") to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission certainly reflect advocacy positions that a prosecutor's group might also take. For exam-
ple, a recent POAG position paper urged the Commission to limit defense counsel's ability to vacate
prior sentences that might otherwise be used to enhance a defendant's sentence. The group characterizes
this legitimate defense advocacy as a "manipulation" of the federal sentence. Meeting Minutes, Proba-
tion Officers Advisory Group to the United States Sentencing Commission, 3 (July 26-27, 2001), at
http://www.ussc.gov/POAG/min6 26 01 .PDF.
260 Indeed, even when defendants and prosecutors take a unified position about guidelines calcula-
tions (for example, with plea bargains that include guidelines stipulations), probation officers may op-
pose the negotiated agreement, advocating instead what the officer believes to be a correct guidelines
outcome. Those who suggest that the probation officer does not advocate for the Commission need look
only at the Probation Officer's Advisory Group which was formed to "assist the Commission in carrying
out its statutory responsibilities ... and to represent U.S. Probation Officers (USPOs) in the area of sen-
tencing." United States Probation Officers Advisory Group to the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Charter, at http://www.ussc.gov/POAG/charter.html.
261 Findley & Ross, supra note 234, 846 n.37 (citing U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Notice to Counsel in Criminal Appeals Raising Issues Related to the Legality of a Criminal Sentence
(Dec. 3, 1987); U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Notice to Counsel for Appellants in Crimi-
nal Cases (Mar. I, 1988)).
262 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(2) (2000). There has also been a corresponding increase in the numbers of
appeals that address sentencing issues. In 1988, one year after the guidelines' effective date, there were
only 225 federal appeals that challenged the defendant's sentence. In 2000, sixty-one percent of appeals
filed in the federal courts raised at least one sentencing issue. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2000 Source-
book of Federal Sentencing Statistics, at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table55.pdf.
263 PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 160, at 7-28.
264 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 1262. The Federal Rules Committee recently recognized
the importance of representation at the presentence interview by requiring probation officers to give de-
fense counsel "adequate notice" of the time and place of the presentence interview. While this change
underscores the general recognition of the important role counsel can play in the presentence investiga-
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Although the Guidelines Manual encourages cooperation and candor, a
defendant's cooperation and candor with the probation officer can have
mixed results. For example, if a defendant cooperates in the interview, the
probation officer may form a more favorable impression of the defendant.
Frank admissions about past misconduct, criminal history, drug use, and
participation in the crime may tip the scale in the defendant's favor when
the probation officer has to make judgment calls about guidelines calcula-
tions and sentencing recommendations.265 Yet, those same admissions may
result in increases in the defendant's guidelines calculation.266
Attorneys experienced in federal criminal practice appreciate the dan-
gers of this new presentence interview. They prepare for the presentence
interview in much the same way as they would prepare for legal argument
before the court.267 Because the probation officer will question the defen-
dant about his personal history, criminal history, drug use, and the offense
conduct, responsible defense counsel prepare a client for the interview in
much the same way as they would prepare a client to testify at trial.268 The
client must be able to give the interviewer "an accurate version of facts" but
must be taught to avoid revealing "relevant conduct or past criminal con-
duct" that may increase the guidelines calculation.269 With unsophisticated
or awkward clients, counsel may need to submit a written statement of the
offense instead of letting the client answer the probation officer's ques-
tions.7 A review of the completed presentence report may demonstrate
that the probation officer relied upon the defendant's statements at the pre-
sentence interview to increase the guidelines calculation. When the defense
contests the probation officer's conclusions, the issue becomes a fight over
who said what at the presentence interview. Of course, only one party's
statements are generally at issue: the defendant's. In disputes over what
tion, the rule misses the mark. Counsel's opportunity to attend is extended as a courtesy, not as a right.
Moreover, the rule offers the attorney a choice about whether she will attend the interview. The rule
does not permit the defendant to decide whether he wants his attorney to attend.
265 HUTCHINSON ET AL., supra note 144, at 1515.
266 Id.
267 Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 246, at 29.
268 Id. The interview itself is so fraught with risks that some expert defense attorneys advise against
permitting the probation officer to interview the defendant at all. Id.; accord, HUTCHINSON ET AL., SU-
pra note 144, at 1515 ("[D]efense counsel must evaluate whether it is in the defendant's best interest to
cooperate with the probation officer."). Some defense attorneys permit the interview, but condition the
interview itself on the probation officer's explicit agreement not to ask about certain topics. AN
INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL GUIDELINE SENTENCING 16 (5th ed. 2001). When I practiced in the East-
em District of New York, we had an agreement with the Probation Department that, in drug courier
cases, the interview could be conducted without defense counsel. In exchange, the Probation Depart-
ment promised not to ask the defendant about the offense, his criminal history, or any past history of
drug abuse. In addition, the Probation Department agreed to recommend downward adjustments for the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility and minimal role in the offense.
269 Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 246, at 29-30.
270 Id. While it has "always been good practice for the defense to have a written statement regard-
ing the offense," in a guidelines era "this defense practice is now an absolute necessity." Id. at 29-3 1.
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the defendant said at the interview, judges may be predisposed to credit the
testimony of the officer who is a repeated institutional player and an "arm
of the court" over the testimony of a defendant.27' If an attorney is not there
to witness the confrontation, the outcome of such a hearing is a foregone
conclusion.
A defendant need not expose himself to the risks of providing informa-
tion that will increase his guidelines range; he retains his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination during the presentence procedure.272
However, despite the many risks of a presentence interview, a defendant
may be ill-served by a decision not to answer the probation officer's ques-
tions. A practitioner's guide explains: "the presentence interview holds
many perils" but "refusal to submit to an unrestricted presentence inter-
view" can "jeopardize the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility or
adversely affect other incidents of the sentence."2"' In the face of this Hob-
son's choice, experts can only suggest that "counsel make an informed de-
cision as to the best course in the context of the particular case."2'4 The
bottom line is this: the presentence interview of the defendant has powerful
and tangible consequences for the defendant's sentencing guidelines calcu-
lation, and the probation officer's subjective opinion of the defendant's
statements and demeanor has a measurable and often irrevocable impact
upon the sentencing outcome. 5
271 For example, in United States v. Cortes, the guidelines required the district court to determine
whether defendant had admitted that he knew certain funds were drug proceeds. 922 F.2d 123, 128 (2d
Cir. 1990). Because defense counsel was not present at the presentence interview, the court heard testi-
mony from the probation officer and defendant about what defendant said at the interview. Unsurpris-
ingly, the court credited the probation officer's testimony and increased the defendant's guidelines level
by two points. This deference to the probation officer reflects the view of some judges that the proba-
tion officers are the "court family." Certainly they are privileged family members who can and do have
ex parte communications with the court. Coleman, supra note 240, at 226; see also United States v.
Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Humphrey, 154 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Sifuentez, 30 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th
Cir. 1990).
272 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 319 (1999) (holding that in federal sentencing system a
plea of guilty is not a waiver of right to assert Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
connection with sentencing hearings and a defendant's refusal to testify at a sentencing hearing does not
entitle the court to draw an adverse inference in making guidelines fact-finding). It is unclear whether
and to what extent Mitchell would prevent a court from concluding that a defendant's silence at the pre-
sentence interview precludes a guidelines adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
273 AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL GUIDELINE SENTENCING, supra note 268, at 17. Some district
courts have acknowledged that the advice counsel gives in concerning the presentence interview may
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Sarno, No. 97C2733, 1998 WL
547302 (N.D. 111. Aug. 27, 1998); United States v. Daily, 970 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. I11. 1997); D'Amico v.
United States, Nos. 94 Civ. 3825, 7S 88 Cr. 919, 1995 WL 234651 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995) (assuming
that trial counsel's advice about handling presentence interview could constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel).
274 AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL GUIDELINE SENTENCING, supra note 268, at 17.
275 Probation officers readily concede that an officer's "subjective determination" about a defen-
dant's presentence interview performance may determine whether a defendant receives a downward ad-
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3. The Need for Counsel at the Presentence Interview.-In connec-
tion with guidelines calculations based on offender conduct, a defendant's
"casual, ill-considered or inaccurate answers, offered [at the presentence in-
terview] without a full understanding of the potential consequences, may
result in a substantial increase in the recommended period of incarcera-
tion." '276 Yet, if defense counsel fails to show up for the presentence inter-
view and, as a consequence, the defendant blurts out information that
increases his sentence, the defendant has no claim that the statements were
taken in violation of his right to counsel.
Commentators insist that it is "critical" that counsel accompany her
client to the presentence interview, particularly in cases that involve dis-
putes over guidelines adjustments or enhancement. 77 Counsel should have
a clear advocacy agenda for the presentence interview.278 At the interview
itself, counsel should "protect [the] client from the negative impact of his or
her own admissions or dissembling." '279
Reported cases demonstrate the measurable consequences of conduct
at the probation interview. In United States v. Dingle, the preliminary pre-
sentence report indicated that the total amount of cocaine involved was ap-
proximately nine and a half kilograms. 8 ° Later, the defendant Earl Scott
met with the probation officer for a presentence interview; his attorney did
not attend.
At the interview, Scott admitted to five years of weekly drugs sales of
between one and two kilograms of cocaine.28' Based on Scott's statements,
the probation officer revised the report and held Scott responsible for fifty
kilograms of cocaine, more than five times the amount contemplated by the
preliminary report.282 Measured in guidelines terms, the interview caused a
four point increase in Scott's base offense level, and a correspondingly sub-
stantial increase in the recommended range of incarceration. 3
justment for the acceptance of responsibility. Meeting Minutes, supra note 259, at 1. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is difficult to imagine how a defense attorney who does not attend the interview could
construct a meaningful cross-examination and undermine the officer's description of the defendant's
statements and demeanor that led to the conclusion that the defendant was not entitled to the adjustment.
276 United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1990).
277 PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 160, at 7-28 ("It is im-
perative ... that defense counsel accompany the client to the presentence interview."); accord Purdy &
Gelpi, supra note 246, at 29; AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL GUIDELINE SENTENCING, supra note 268,
at 16. "Because the presentence interview holds many perils ... defense counsel should attend the in-
terview." Id.; see also United States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181, 1186 (6th Cir. 1990) (speculating on de-
fense counsel's failure to attend the presentence interview, the court said "[i]f this had been a civil case,
one wonders whether the lawyer would let his client be deposed without counsel being present").
278 See, e.g., Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 246, at 29-30.
279 Id. at 29.
280 United States v. Dingle, Nos. 90-5083, 90-5084, 1991 WL 217017 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 1991).
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Had Scott's attorney properly considered the possible consequences of
the presentence interview, he would have advised Scott not to answer ques-
tions about his conduct. Scott could still have answered questions about
such matters as his personal history, family background, and medical his-
tory. Or, counsel could have advised Scott not to attend the interview at
all.284 Instead, Scott's attorney failed to provide any meaningful assistance
in connection with the interview.
Similarly, in United States v. Gordon,285 the defendant pled guilty to
drug offenses. Gordon's counsel did not attend the presentence interview.
At the interview, the probation officer questioned Gordon about his role in
the drug dealing; Gordon allegedly attempted to minimize his role in the
transactions.286 As a result, the probation officer recommended that the
court not award Gordon the two-point downward adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility.287
The facts are fairly obvious: counsel's failure to attend the presentence
interview resulted in admissions that increased the defendant's sentence.
The holdings are equally clear: there is no right to counsel at the presen-
tence interview. What is perplexing is the obvious disconnect between the
rhetoric of Sixth Amendment rights and the application of those rights to
the presentence interview. None of the Courts of Appeals that have exam-
ined this issue have reached beyond the bright-line analysis.288 Instead, the
Courts of Appeals have engaged in a perfunctory inquiry: is the probation
officer the defendant's adversary? The perfunctory answer? The probation
officer serves the court and thus she is not the defendant's adversary. These
courts wrongly end their inquiry here, rather than considering the extent to
which the probation officer influences sentencing outcomes. Accordingly,
they erroneously hold that defendants are not entitled to the assistance of
counsel at the presentence interview.
Nevertheless, some courts are sympathetic to the problems created
when the bright-line right-to-counsel rule is applied to the presentence in-
terview. While refusing to extend the constitutional right to counsel, the
First Circuit acknowledges how important counsel's presence can be but as-
284 The interview added four points to Scott's guidelines calculations; under the then-existing ver-
sion of the Guidelines, the most Scott had to gain from the presentence interview was a recommendation
that his guidelines range be reduced by two points for the acceptance of responsibility. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3ElI (1991). The district court could have awarded Scott that
two-point sentence reduction simply on the basis of his guilty plea or on the basis of an admission that
did not specify the quantities involved in his prior drug transactions. There was simply no reason for
Scott to have provided the relevant conduct information to the probation officer.
285 United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567 (10th Cir. 1993).
286 Id. at 1571.
287 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.I (2002).
288 Some courts have reserved ruling on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Simpson, 904
F.2d 607 (11 th Cir. 1990).
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sumes that "because the probation department's policy is to allow defense
counsel to attend presentence interviews," the issue of ineffective assistance
for failure to attend the interview is unlikely to occur. 289 The First Circuit's
optimism is unwarranted. So long as defense counsel's attendance at the in-
terview is a rule-based courtesy, conditioned on counsel's "timely request,"
some defense counsel will make untimely requests and others will choose
not to attend. Moreover, extending the courtesy to counsel does nothing to
extend a right or even a voice to the truly interested party, the defendant. A
rule-based decision to "allow" defense counsel to attend the interview is not
the same as acknowledging a constitutional right to counsel.
Under these circumstances, logic dictates that the right to counsel
should exist at the presentence interview. As the Second Circuit noted, al-
beit in the context of a proffer session, a defendant may need the assistance
of counsel, either to properly understand the questions posed or to maintain
the courage and confidence necessary to give truthful answers to difficult
questions.290 From a defendant's perspective, the presentence interview is a
similarly difficult procedure and one that also requires the "guiding hand of
counsel." Denying defendants the assistance of counsel at the presentence
interview is contrary to the fundamental values driving the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. For Sixth Amendment purposes, it matters not
whether an individual probation officer acts as an advocate for the prosecu-
tor or the Commission, or even whether the officer advocates for the defen-
dant. As will be seen in Part IV.B, the substitution of meaningful Sixth
Amendment inquiry for rote invocations of the critical stage doctrine dem-
onstrates the right to counsel inheres at the presentence interview.29'
C. Sentence Reductions Under Rule 35(b)
By its nature, sentencing has an element of finality. Absent a success-
ful appeal of the sentence, few American jurisdictions permit a defendant to
return to court in the days, weeks, or years following a sentence to declare
that "things have changed; I've changed; I deserve a new sentence." In the
federal system, the abolition of parole has increased the finality of the judi-
cially imposed sentence. Prisoners sentenced under the Sentencing Reform
Act will serve all of their time, less any good time reduction.
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, there was a limited mechanism for
reducing a lawfully imposed sentence. Under the pre-1987 version of Rule
35, either party had 120 days from the imposition of a sentence to move to
reduce the sentence.292 While the rule permitted judges to make dramatic
sentencing changes, even from a jail sentence to a probationary sentence, it
289 United States v. Ocasio-Rivera, 991 F.2d 1, 3 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1993).
290 United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996).
291 Extending the right to counsel to the presentence interview is clearly the better view." PRACTICE
UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 160, at 7-29.
292 FED. R. GRIM. P. 35(b) (1944) (amended 1987).
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was rarely used and was almost never a procedure explicitly contemplated
by the parties in their plea bargaining. Rather, the old Rule 35(b) motion
was a request for leniency.293 The proceeding was intended as a "final
glance backward" '294 by the district court so that the court could determine
whether, in hindsight, the sentence imposed "seems unduly harsh." '295 The
motion was to be decided in the discretion of the trial court296 and the stan-
dard of review was the abuse of that discretion. 97
In the new world of federal criminal procedure, efforts to obtain a sen-
tence reduction occupy a prominent place. This radical change from previ-
ous practice has been accomplished by inducing defendants to help
prosecute and convict other individuals. Under the new system, the revised
Rule 35(b) provides for a post-judgment sentence reduction based upon one
single factor: the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities in the in-
vestigation and prosecution of others. The reduction motion can be made
only by the prosecutor. Under most circumstances, the motion must be
filed within one year of the date of sentencing. 98
1. Cooperation with Authorities.-There was once an era when a co-
operator was scorned by cops, counsel,299 and criminals alike as an 'in-
293 United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hill, 826 F.2d 507,
509 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ames, 743 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Poole v.
United States, 250 F.2d 396, 399 (D.C. Cit. 1957).
294 DeCologero, 821 F.2d at 41.
295 Ames, 743 F.2d at 48; accord United States v. Distasio, 820 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1987).
296 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) (Warren, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 255
F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Brummett, 786 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1986).
297 The right to counsel does not extend to post-conviction proceedings and courts almost unani-
mously viewed these old Rule 35(b) motions as collateral: a defendant had no right to the assistance of
counsel in the filing of a Rule 35(b) motion. Accordingly, even if an attorney negligently failed to
timely file a viable 35(b) motion, the defendant could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill,
826 F.2d at 509. Hill cites Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (no right to effective assistance
of counsel at post-conviction proceeding) and compares Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.
1985) (remedy for counsel's failure to timely file motion for sentence reduction under pre-1987 version
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)) with United States v. Nevarez-Diaz, 648 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
(no remedy for counsel's failure to timely file motions for sentence reduction under pre-1987 version of
Fed. R. Crim P. 35(b)).
298 Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) was recently revised to permit courts limited authority to grant motions
for sentence reductions made more than one year after the imposition of sentence. Previously, the one
year time limit was jurisdictional. United States v. McDowell, 117 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. McWilliams, 194 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Wis. 2000). Under the old law, the sole exception to this
one-year limit occurred if the "defendant's substantial assistance involve[d] information or evidence not
known by the defendant until one year or more after sentence is imposed." FED. R. CRM. P. 35(b).
Now, the Rule permits a later motion if (a) "information provided by the defendant to the government
within one year of sentencing.., did not become useful" until more than one year after the sentence; or
(b) the defendant could not reasonably have anticipated the usefulness of the information until more than
one year after sentence; and, upon recognizing its usefulness, promptly provided it to the government.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(2)(B), (C) (2002).
299 Even under the guidelines regime, some criminal defense attorneys refuse to represent clients
who cooperate with the government. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 166, at 69 n. I (citing the affidavit
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former,' a 'stool pigeon,' and a 'rat.' Now, cooperation with law enforce-
ment is a routine part of criminal procedure. Substantial sentencing re-
wards for cooperation are imbedded into the statutory and guidelines
sentencing structure. As noted above, based on successful cooperation, a
prosecutor (and a prosecutor alone) may move for a sentence below the
guidelines range and even below the statutory mandatory minimum. 00
While much has been written about the way modem federal criminal prac-
tice has altered the balance of power within the system, little has been said
about the way cooperation has changed defense counsel's role.3"' Yet, de-
fense attorneys play a vital role in the cooperation process,0 2 and the coop-
eration process has expanded the type of work criminal defense attorneys
do.
Rule 35 practice is often the result of both negotiations and cooperation
agreements. In some Rule 35 cases, substantial assistance is a bargained-
for element of the plea agreement. Sometimes, the parties contemplate that
the substantial assistance motion will occur at the initial guidelines sentenc-
ing proceeding. When that happens, if the cooperation is successful, the
government moves under the guidelines for a downward departure pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 5K1l.l 03 In other cases, whether by design or by happen-
stance, the departure motion is deferred until a date uncertain, a date that is
usually within one year of the guidelines sentence.
Although the new Rule 35(b) motion is often a form of consideration
explicitly bargained for in the plea agreement, courts continue to cling to
the analysis employed for consideration of pre-1987 claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Relying on the letter of the critical stage doctrine,
courts have held that a motion for sentence reduction under Rule 35(b) is a
collateral proceeding at which a defendant has no right to the assistance of
counsel.3"
filed by attorney Barry Tarlow in United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd,
989 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1993), amended and superseded by 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also id. at
118 n. 168 (the Michael Metzger referenced throughout Richman's article is no relation to the author).
300 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000).
301 For example, Daniel Stiller's article, Deepening the Distrust Between Federal Defendant and
Federal Defender, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 304 (1999), suggests that the guidelines have fundamen-
tally altered the relationship between public defender and indigent defendant, aggravating the "inherent
distrust" the client has for counsel. He does not address the vital role counsel can and should play in the
cooperation negotiation process.
302 Richman, supra note 166, at 73-74.303 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2002).
304 United States. v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kimberlin, 898 F.2d
1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ahern, 836 F. Supp. 492, 495 (N.D. I11. 1993); United
States v. Nevarez-Diaz, 648 F. Supp. 1226, 1230-31 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Silano v. United States, 621 F.
Supp. 1103, 1105 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Hamid, 461 A.2d 1043, 1044 (D.C. 1983). In Co-
operating Clients, Richman suggests that the court's almost inevitable deference to the government's
characterization of the defendant's cooperation marginalizes the role that defendant's counsel can play
in advocating at the sentence reduction hearing. Richman, supra note 166, at 105. Although courts are
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2. When a Sentence is Not a Sentence.-In Rule 35 cases, the harm
worked by application of the critical stage doctrine to these proceedings can
be divided into two types: harm to the defendant's ability to cooperate and
harm to the sentencing outcome when the government files (or intends to
file) a motion for sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). These harms are
particularly unfair because they result solely from the timing of the substan-
tial assistance motion and are no reflection upon the extent or success of the
defendant's cooperation." 5
At sentences in which all parties expect there to be a subsequent Rule
35(b) motion, the refusal to extend the right to post-sentence counsel is
truly egregious. The uncounselled defendant is severely impaired in her
ability to render substantial assistance and thereby complete her part of the
bargain that she entered into with the government." 6 The impairment stems
from the crucial role counsel plays in assuring that the cooperation bargain
comes to fruition.
In United States v. Ming He, a case arising under § 5K1.1, the Second
Circuit discussed counsel's role in the cooperation process."0 7 The court re-
jected the idea that counsel's role in cooperation is "minimal because the
defendant need only answer questions truthfully.""3 8  Instead, the court
looked to the "real world" to see how counsel could assist a cooperating de-
fendant. First, counsel can smooth her client's way; she can "translate"
what may be confusing or intimidating questions and help her client stay
focused during the debriefing process.30 9 Second, counsel can remind her
instructed by the guidelines to give great weight to the government's evaluation of the defendant's assis-
tance, Richman imagines too narrow a role for counsel. As will be set forth infra at Part III, counsel can
play a vital role not only in the government's decision to file a motion but also in the court's decision
about the extent of the departure.
305 In the far-flung reaches of the federal court system, each district has different practices with re-
spect to the choice of using § 5KI.1 motions or Rule 35 motions. Thus, the district of prosecution or the
random allotment of a case to a particular judge may be the sole reason that a cooperation departure is
raised under Rule 35(b) instead of § 5KI.I. For example, in the "rocket docket" courthouse of the East-
ern District of Virginia, the judges routinely refuse to delay sentences until a defendant's cooperation is
completed. As a consequence, cooperators in that district are sentenced under Rule 35(b). Daniel C.
Richman, The Challenges of Investigating Section 5K1. 1 in Practice, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 75
(1998). See, e.g., United States v. Speed, 53 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that parties were not
entitled to a continuance of sentence pending government determination of whether defendant had pro-
vided substantial assistance).
306 In order to protect the privacy of the individuals whose cases I have reviewed, I have presented
here a single hypothetical defendant whose circumstances are a compilation of several individual cases.
Documentation of the individual cases are on file in my office.
307 In a case decided after this Article was written, but before it was published, the Ninth Circuit
held that presentence cooperation is a critical stage at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assis-
tance of counsel. United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d III I(9th Cir. 2003).
308 United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1996).
309 Id. at 790. For example, I have been involved in debriefing sessions at which the prosecutor
asked questions about "money laundering conspiracy." My client had an eighth grade education and
spoke little English. Not surprisingly, he insisted he had never joined a conspiracy and that he knew
nothing about "washing money." Had I not been there, the session might have been terminated because
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client that "while he is seeking the assistance and protection of the govern-
ment, that entity does not share the defendant's interests, even after the exe-
cution of a 'cooperation agreement'.""3 ' Where appropriate, defense
counsel may "assist the defendant in clarifying his answers to ensure that
they are complete and accurate."'3t  As noted earlier, if a hearing becomes
necessary, an attorney who attended the debriefing can serve as a witness to
her client's debriefing performance." 2 Or, counsel can effectively cross-
examine other witnesses to the debriefing (such as a case agent) by recon-
structing for the court the events of the debriefing interview.3 3 Defense
counsel would thus play an important part in assisting her client in his effort
to show he provided substantial assistance." 4
A defendant cooperating prior to the imposition of sentence would
clearly have a right to counsel's assistance at a proffer session or debrief-
ing. 315  Yet, a defendant has no right to his counsel's assistance if he is
forced to fulfill his part of the plea bargain through post-sentence coopera-
tion. This patently unfair result flies in the face of the rule set down in
Mempa:
Whether it be called a sentence, a resentence or a post-judgment motion for
sentence reduction should be irrelevant. What matters is that the proceeding
carries the significant risk that the defendant will be sentenced on incomplete
or erroneous information and only counsel's assistance could significantly
lessen the extent of that prejudice.31 6
the prosecutor clearly did not believe the defendant. When I rephrased the questions and asked "who
asked you to handle the money?" and "who else helped with the money?," my client was able to answer
and the debriefing continued. See also Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L.
REv. 563, 619-20 (1999).
310 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 790.
311 Id. Responsible defense counsel debrief their clients well in advance of any meeting with the
government. Thus, they are in a position to assist a client over "rough spots" where the client has diffi-
culty telling his story.
312 Id.
313 Id. (noting that this function is "analogous to the role defense counsel plays in avoiding preju-
dice at a lineup identification") (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967)).
314 Id. at 782. In Ming He, the prosecution made a lukewarm § 5KI .1 motion. The defense argued
that the prosecution had violated Ming He's right to counsel when, contrary to counsel's instructions,
the government debriefed Ming He outside his counsel's presence. Although the Second Circuit de-
clined to address the Sixth Amendment issue, it relied upon its power to "supervise the administration of
justice" to hold that "cooperating witnesses are entitled to have counsel present at debriefing." Id. at
793. As noted in Ming He, had these issues played out in a Rule 35 context, Ming He would not even
have had counsel available to him to make these arguments.
315 See, e.g., United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jones, Criminal
No. 02-527, 2001 WL 127300 (E.D. La. June 10, 2003) (where cooperation is "crucial to the plea agree-
ment... "it was constitutionally ineffective for [attorney] to allow the [debriefing] session to go forward
without him").
316 See supra Part I.B.2.
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While there are no statistics documenting requests for assistance of
counsel in Rule 35 proceedings, reported case law demonstrates that in-
mates can and do request the assistance of their appointed counsel to help
facilitate or enforce written plea bargain agreements that contemplate Rule
35 motions. However, under the critical stage doctrine, a defendant is not
entitled to counsel in Rule 35 because those proceedings are "post-
sentence" or "collateral" proceedings.3 7 These rulings underscore the ab-
surdity of assessing the right to counsel based on the formalities associated
with the proceeding. Indeed, the Supreme Court's ruling in Mempa seems
to speak directly to the Rule 35(b) issue."8 In Mempa, the Court emphati-
cally insisted that a defendant had the right to counsel at a "deferred sen-
tence" proceeding that arose as a consequence of the defendant's post-
sentence conduct when all parties to the previous sentence understood that
such future conduct would result in a resentence.3 9
In these cases, the participants may share a sense that the current sen-
tencing procedure is, at best, a dry run and, at worst, a sham. Judges will
impose a severe sentence and state, "I'm looking forward to seeing the Rule
35 motion" in your case. Under these circumstances, it is irresponsible and
intellectually dishonest to assert that the Rule 35(b) sentencing hearing is a
post-conviction matter. It is not. It is an integral part of the underlying plea
negotiation and a continuation of the sentencing procedure, a procedure at
which the defendant has an absolute right to counsel."
The injustice in connection with the Rule 35(b) proceeding is clear. In
the plainest instance, the injustice occurs when the government, through
carelessness or inadvertence, fails to file a timely motion for sentence re-
duction under Rule 35(b). Most courts hold that the Rule 35(b) time limit is
a jurisdictional matter and therefore a court cannot grant an untimely mo-
tion for sentence reduction.
Proving the old adage "out-of-sight, out-of-mind," prosecutors can and
do forget to monitor the one-year deadline for the filing of Rule 35(b) mo-
tions.32' Other prosecutors, for strategic reasons, delay filing the Rule
317 United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007
(5th Cir. 1995). Some court-appointed attorneys also adhere to the view that they have no responsibility
for assisting a client who seeks a Rule 35(b) motion, even if that motion was contemplated as part of the
plea bargain. They believe their representation ends when the defendant is sentenced. The author has,
on file, correspondence from appointed attorneys discussing the limits of their representation of indigent
defendants.
318 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
319 Id.
320 The judicial stinginess in this arena is hard to understand since the Criminal Justice Act, which
establishes an appointed counsel system for the federal courts, provides for the appointment of counsel
in "ancillary matters." 18 U.S.C. § 3006 (2000). Nevertheless, several courts have specifically held that
35(b) proceedings are not ancillary.
321 The author has records on file documenting circumstances in which the Assistant United States
Attorney forgot to file the § 5KI. 1.
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35(b), only to discover that the court will not hear the motion. 2 In cases
where it seems that a prosecutor may miss the Rule 35(b) deadline, defense
counsel could serve a critical function-by monitoring the prosecutor's cal-
endar and issuing a reminder about the need for timely filing. If the dead-
line is approaching and the. government shows no signs of filing a Rule
35(b), counsel can move to compel the government to specifically perform
its part of the plea bargain.
Even if the government timely files the Rule 35(b) motion, counsel
should appear at the resentence to serve as her client's advocate. The Rule
35(b) motion is, for all practical purposes, identical to a motion for depar-
ture under U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1. 32 3 The only real difference between the two is
in their timing.324 Accordingly, in considering a Rule 35(b) motion, the sen-
tencing court considers the same five factors it considers when ruling on
motions for downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5KI.l: (1) the useful-
ness of the defendant's assistance; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and
reliability of that information; (3) the nature and extent of his assistance; (4)
the impact of assistance on the defendant and his family; and (5) the timeli-
ness of the defendant's assistance.325 Thus, while a government motion is
the sole trigger for a 35(b) motion, a government motion may not contain
all the information that the court will consider when imposing a sentence.
For example, a defendant has direct, first-hand experience with the
dangers he incurred through his cooperation.326 The defendant may also
have information, not available to the government, about the extent to
which his cooperation influenced other individuals' decisions to plead
guilty.327 Indeed, as to each of the five factors, the defendant and the gov-
ernment may have different information and different views. Based on the
fact that the defendant has unique and highly relevant insights to provide at
a Rule 35(b) sentence, the Second Circuit has held that, when the govern-
ment files a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction, the defendant has a
right to reply to or comment about the government's submission.128 But this
322 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 270 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the government delib-
erately delayed filing Doe's Rule 35(b) motion because it thought it might need Doe as a witness at a
later trial).
323 United States v. Gangi, 45 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1995).
324 Id.; United States v. Smith, 839 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Howard, 902 F.2d 894,
896 (11 th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Perez, 955 F.2d 34, 35 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Doe, 940 F.2d 199, 203 n.7 (7th Cir. 1991).
325 Gangi, 45 F.3d at 31.
326 Id.
327 For example, the government may argue that since all targeted coconspirators pled guilty, the
defendant's substantial assistance was limited. The defendant may know through friends, family, or as-
sociates that it was the threat of his testimony that convinced the coconspirators to plead guilty.
328 Gangi, 45 F.3d at 3 1.
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limited right only begs the Sixth Amendment question. The right to be
heard is "of little avail without the corresponding right to counsel."329
Of course, if the prosecution makes a motion for departure under
§ 5Kl.1, the defendant has a constitutional right to counsel.33 ° When the
prosecution files a sentence reduction motion under U.S.S.G. § 5Ki.1, de-
fense counsel receives a copy of the prosecution's motion. If the prosecu-
tion's motion fails to accurately describe the defendant's cooperation,
defense counsel will file her own submission, adding details that the prose-
cution may have overlooked and providing information relevant to the de-
parture but likely to be known only to defense counsel. 3 ' Defense counsel
can submit her own account of the cooperation. She can describe the extent
of the risk to which her client was exposed,332 she can contest the govern-
ment's account of her client's efforts,333 she can even present evidence or
call witnesses to testify about the impact of her client's cooperation.334
Counsel can make oral argument to the court, she can answer the court's
questions, she can rebut the government's contentions, and she can urge the
court to grant a departure that is even greater than that requested by the
government. When necessary, counsel can also move to compel the gov-
ernment to honor its promise to file the departure motion.335
Yet, when the government moves for a sentence reduction under Rule
35(b), the rigid critical stage doctrine classifies the proceeding as a "collat-
eral" motion and the right to counsel never applies to collateral proceedings.
The illogic is stunning. Sentences with sentence reduction motions, and
Rule 35(b) resentences are, in essence, identical proceedings, where courts
329 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 462 (1938).
330 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
331 Gangi, 45 F.3dat 31.
332 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. A defendant who cooperates from inside the
prison system faces serious safety risks. In jailhouse parlance: "snitches get stitches." See, e.g., United
States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1376 n.76 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Whenever a defendant cooperates with
law enforcement by identifying confederates, his safety in the correction system and elsewhere is in se-
rious jeopardy."), rev 'don other grounds sub nom United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
333 See, e.g., United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1996).
[Diefense counsel can serve as a potential witness at sentencing to the fact that her client fully per-
formed the promise that he made to the government. This reconstruction of the debriefing inter-
view at sentencing-were the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing-is analogous to the
role defense counsel plays in avoiding prejudice at a lineup identification.
Id. The right to counsel implications of this role are discussed infra Part IV.
334 In assisting a woman seeking a Rule 35 sentence reduction, I obtained from the attorney of a
convicted co-conspirator a letter verifying that the cooperator's willingness to testify was a direct cause
of the co-conspirator's decision to plead guilty.
335 Richman, supra note 166, at 90. Richman describes the critical role defense counsel plays "as a
monitor, even a guarantor, of the government's performance." Id. at 91. Richman posits that, as a re-
peat player in the "snitch marketplace," defense attorneys can bring into use market pressures and "in-
formation pooling" to insure that prosecutors have an incentive to honor their bargains. Id. at 74. By
what mechanism can the unrepresented defendant do the same?
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consider the same factors in assessing sentences. However, the timing of
the proceeding now dictates whether a defendant has a right to counsel.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Having identified the inadequacies of the critical stage doctrine, the
question remains: what is to be done about the problem? After all, the les-
son learned from cases like Betts seems to be that case-by-case analyses of
the right to counsel do not work. They are inefficient, unpredictable, and
burdensome to trial and appellate courts. However, the current rule fails to
satisfy the ends for which it was intended. This Article proposes that, lest
we throw the baby out with the bath water, we retain the conclusions that
the bright-line test has established: the right to counsel always inheres in
the period between the filing of formal charges and the imposition of sen-
tence. Thus, courts need not conduct any new analysis about the right to
counsel at these traditionally 'critical' stages. However, when considering
the right to counsel at the margins of the critical stage doctrine, courts
should ignore the critical stage doctrine and instead should analyze whether
the stage is one at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies."'
The modem machinery of criminal justice presents unique threats to
the constitutional promise of fair play in criminal prosecutions. Once again
the time has come for Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to evolve to meet a
new challenge. That challenge is best met by evaluating right-to-counsel
questions with reference to factual indicia that demonstrate the need for
counsel. These indicia can be culled from the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment cases and can be deemed the hallmarks of a case that requires
the "guiding hand of counsel" to insure a fair process. The indicia a court
should consider are: (1) adversariness-in-fact between the individual and
the prosecution ("adversariness-in-fact"); (2) complexity in the procedural
stage in question ("complexity"); and (3) potential prejudice to the individ-
ual, which prejudice can be countered by providing counsel ("preju-
dice/benefit").
Each of these indicia is discussed briefly below.
Adversariness-in-Fact
This factor assesses whether the government and the individual are
clearly adversaries, i.e., whether the potential for an adversary relationship
has solidified. Thus, this factor reflects the fundamental premise that coun-
sel lends meaning to the adversary process by guaranteeing some approxi-
mate equality of adversaries. This factor weighs in favor of the right to
336 For a discussion of possible 'firm' attachment points for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
see Joseph Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying
the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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counsel whenever there is particularized adversariness between the gov-
ernment and an individual, such that the absence of counsel will give the
government an unfair advantage or will determine the outcome of the pro-
ceeding. This assessment of adversariness-in-fact, rather than formal ad-
versariness, recognizes that the government may well commit itself to
prosecuting but delay filing a formal charge. It addresses the Sixth
Amendment's focus on criminal "prosecutions" without devolving into
formulaic restrictions about what types of proceedings mark the beginning
of a prosecution. With its requirement of particularized adversariness be-
tween the government and one individual, this factor also recognizes that
not every investigation is itself the initiation of a criminal prosecution.
In weighing this factor, a court should ask: has the government evi-
denced its intent to prosecute either formally or through informal means,
such as grand jury investigation, plea bargaining, or pre-charge discussions
with the suspect or with defense counsel? A court should also ask whether,
had any such discussions between the parties broken down, the government
would then have initiated formal charges. A court should also inquire
whether it is a temporal fortuity that the case falls outside the traditional
span of the critical stage doctrine. This factor would thus address pre-
indictment and post-sentence cases and those cases in which there has been
either inadvertent or deliberate manipulation of the process in order to cir-
cumvent the defendant's right to appointed counsel.337
Procedural Complexity
This factor considers the extent to which the defendant confronts intri-
cacies of the criminal procedure system that may be "mysterious, intricate
and complex" or may have consequences that are unpredictable for the lay-
person. In addressing this factor, a court should consider whether the pro-
ceeding involves intricacies of criminal procedure that would be unknown
and unsuspected by a layperson. A court should consider not only the com-
plexity of the actual procedure, but also the complexity of the consequences
that may flow from the proceeding. This consideration echoes the Court's
concern in Wade that a defendant in a line-up might speak or act in a way
that has trial consequences unimaginable to the layperson. Similarly, a de-
fendant may now confront players in the criminal justice system (such as
pretrial services officers or probation officers) who pose seemingly simple
questions, the answers to which have serious implications for trial or sen-
tence. It is these collateral consequences that are truly "mysterious, intri-
337 See, e.g., Bruce v. Duckworth, 659 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1981) (government deliberately de-
layed formal charges in order to evade attachment of right to counsel and permit lineup without counsel
present); see also United States v. Hall, 804 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1986) (state cannot delay formal
charging proceedings in order to "suspend the right to counsel until it has neatly tied its case together
and obtained, unmonitored, the desired line-up identifications" (quoting United States ex rel. Burton v.
Cuyler, 439 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd582 F.2d 1278 (3d Cir. 1978)).
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cate" and unknowable to a layperson. Where such complexities exist, this
factor weighs in favor of the right to appointed counsel.
Prejudice and Benefit
This factor addresses whether the proceeding exposes the defendant to
substantial potential prejudice at trial or sentence and whether counsel's as-
sistance at the proceeding will mitigate that potential for prejudice. This
factor is, in large measure, a restatement of the prejudice/benefit analysis
used in Wade and Mempa. Where the proceeding carries a risk of substan-
tial potential prejudice to the outcome of a trial or sentence, the balance tips
toward a finding of a right to counsel. Thus, if the effects of the proceeding
are irrevocable, this factor will weigh heavily in favor of finding a right to
counsel."'
As to counsel's ability to lessen the potential prejudice, this considera-
tion recognizes that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not merely a
cosmetic right. If counsel's assistance is necessary to enable a meaningful
representation: for example, through cross-examination at trial or at sen-
tence, then this factor tips in favor of affording a right to counsel. This fac-
tor also favors a right to counsel when a defendant must communicate with
a third party who is not an adversary (such as the judge or a probation offi-
cer) and the defendant's statements will affect the outcome at trial or sen-
tence. In that circumstance, if the defendant faces substantial potential
prejudice, his counsel's presence may help avoid a miscommunication. If
the parties cannot agree upon what was said, counsel can cross-examine and
reconstruct for the court what occurred at the proceeding.
If a court considers these three factors and determines that the Sixth
Amendment requires the appointment of counsel that ends the inquiry. Ef-
ficiency and law enforcement concerns should not be considered if the court
finds that counsel is necessary to effectuate the Sixth Amendment's prom-
ise. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel brooks no balancing test of its
merit and the right is not intended to advance crime control goals.339
For the sake of thoroughness, this Article takes my proposal for a "test
drive" in the pre-charge negotiation, the presentence interview, and the Rule
35(b) resentence. Each example demonstrates how the three-factor analysis
promotes a meaningful assessment of whether the right to counsel inheres
in any given situation.
338 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (arraignment is stage at which defendant
has right to counsel because "[w]hat happens there may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may
be... irretrievably lost if not then and there asserted.").
339 See, e.g., Herbert Packer, Two Models of Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. I (1964); see
also Peter Aranella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure, 72 GEO. L.J. 18 (1983).
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A. Pre-Charge Bargaining
In pre-charge bargaining, there are an infinite number of scenarios in
which a defendant might claim that the right to counsel applies. The chal-
lenge is to articulate when police or prosecutors cross over a line that gives
rise to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This Article uses Moody's
case as an example.
Adversariness-in-fact
An analysis of the adversariness-in-fact in Moody aptly illustrates why
identifying a pre-charge right to counsel may be difficult. When Moody's
lawyer rejected the prosecutor's plea agreement, it seems clear that the req-
uisite adversarial positions existed. The government had committed itself
to prosecute and had demonstrated that commitment by making Moody a
formal offer of a plea bargain.34 ° The proposed plea bargain was a concrete
agreement demonstrating the government's strategic and tactical decisions
about how it wanted to both prosecute and reward Moody. 4'
However, analysis of this factor at an earlier stage in Moody's coop-
eration, for example on the day Moody knocked at the FBI's door, might
well produce at a different result. The execution of the search warrants
(which themselves required probable cause) indicated that the government
was investigating Moody with an eye toward prosecuting him. But that
alone would not mean that the adversary relationship between Moody and
the government had solidified, nor would it mean that the government was
committed to prosecuting Moody. And Moody cannot transform his situa-
tion into a more adversarial one simply by knocking on the FBI's door and
thereby awarding himself a right to counsel.
The most difficult question is how to evaluate this factor had Moody
claimed a right to counsel during the period after he made his initial proffer
of information, but before the government offered him a plea agreement.
Under those circumstances, a court would need to undertake a careful fac-
tual analysis to determine whether there was an adversariness-in-fact that
suggested that the defendant needed counsel's assistance to assure a fair
trial or sentence. The court might look to such factors as whether the
prosecutor had been involved with the debriefings, either formally or in-
340 With respect to pre-charge bargaining, a minority of Courts of Appeals have suggested that the
right to counsel may attach prior to formal adversary proceedings if the government crosses the constitu-
tionally significant divide from fact-finder to adversary. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 935 (1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79,
82 (7th Cir. 1986)); accord Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing "the possibility
that the right to counsel might conceivably attach before formal charges" and citing United States v.
Larkin); see also Hall, 804 F.2d at 83. In United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 929 (D.D.C. 1988), a
district court held that the government's clear commitment to prosecute defendant meant that right to
counsel inhered, even before formal initiation ofjudicial proceedings.
341 United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2000).
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formally. The court might also consider whether the government had pre-
pared and delayed filing a complaint or warrant for Moody's arrest. Dis-
cussions about possible sentences, plea agreements, restitution, or immunity
might also indicate the extent to which the parties' adversary positions had
solidified.342
Procedural Complexity
An assessment of this factor in pre-charge bargaining clearly weighs in
favor of the appointment of counsel. This factor evaluates not just the
complexity of the debriefing procedure but the extent to which it may have
complex consequences that a layperson can neither understand nor antici-
pate. The contemporary federal criminal justice system operates under an
intricate system of mandatory sentences and guidelines sentences. Several
treatises are devoted to explaining that system to practitioners. A layperson
like Moody cannot possibly navigate the complex waters of this sentencing
scheme.
In contrast, one might imagine a pre-charge scenario in which the po-
lice sought straightforward evidence from Moody, such as his fingerprints
or a DNA sample. The actual giving of the sample would not be a proce-
dure sufficiently complex to weigh in favor of the appointment of counsel.
The inking procedure, for example, carries no hidden risks, no complex
consequences, and no unstated expectations. The fact that counsel might
wish to make legal arguments about the admissibility or reliability of the
evidence, is irrelevant to the question of whether counsel should be present
for the investigative procedure.
Prejudice and Benefit
Proffering information or negotiating a plea bargain is a situation
fraught with risk for any lay person. Absent counsel's guiding hand, the
government may successfully seek to obtain as many incriminating state-
ments as possible to guarantee that, if the deal falls through, the defendant
cannot reasonably expect to win at trial. 43 If a defendant lacks counsel's
assistance and advice, he may foolishly reject a good bargain or ignore the
necessity of prompt cooperation.
In Moody's case, the potential prejudice was manifest as was the abil-
ity of competent counsel to mitigate that prejudice. The prejudice was two-
fold. First, the government used Moody's statements against him for
342 The fact that the government is engaging in plea negotiations may itself indicate a commitment
to prosecute. See United States v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175, 1180 (6th Cir. 1980) (Wiseman, J., dissent-
ing).
343 Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50 n. 188
(1992). Proffer agreements routinely permit the government to use leads derived from proffered state-




NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
charge and sentence purposes, thereby substantially increasing both his pos-
sible and his actual sentence. Second, Moody refused what was, by any
standards, a plea bargain he should have accepted. Competent counsel
could have minimized or avoided these harms.
If we consider federal pre-charge bargaining generally, we can also see
how the prejudice/benefit indicia favor a right to counsel. Counsel's assis-
tance at a proffer or at negotiations is critical; she can take notes, review
them with the witness, clear up any confusion or faulty memory,344 or testify
as to her client's statements if the government subsequently disputes
whether or to what extent her client cooperated.
As negotiations progress, defense counsel could identify lesser of-
fenses or offenses that carry no mandatory minimum to which a defendant
might plead and propose that the charge be alleged in the indictment or in-
formation.345 Defense counsel can investigate and request a plea at the "go-
ing rate" for the crime alleged in the jurisdiction of prosecution.346 And,
counsel can advocate for the selection of a charge that carries less serious
guidelines consequences." 7
Because all three factors indicate strongly that counsel's assistance was
necessary to guarantee that Moody received fair process, Moody had a
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
B. The Presentence Interview
The presentence interview falls outside the ambit of the critical stage
doctrine because the defendant confronts the probation officer and not the
government. The stated logic is that, because the probation officer is an
"arm of the court," the defendant does not confront his adversary348 and
therefore is not in need of counsel's assistance.349 However, the courts are
asking the wrong question: they are asking for whom the probation officer
works, when they should be asking whether, in view of the work the officer
344 Id. at 44 n.157.
345 Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systematic Ap-
proach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 104 (1995) (discussing counsel's role in identifying and advocating for
lesser charges).
346 Id. at 105.
347 Id. at 112.
348 United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991) (constitutional right to counsel may
"not be invoked in the absence of adversarial proceedings"); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975,
979-82 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1592 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 843-44 (7th Cir.
1989) (right to counsel inheres only when the proceeding in question is of an "adversary character").
349 See, e.g., Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
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does, the assistance of counsel is necessary to provide fair process and fair
results at sentence.35 °
Adversariness-in-fact
In the context of the presentence interview, the ordinary adversariness-
in-fact indicia do not require any analysis. The machinery of the criminal
justice system has been set in motion. The government has charged the de-
fendant. The defendant has either pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial
and will face his professional adversary at sentence. There is thus no ques-
tion as to whether the right to counsel has attached. The issue is whether
that right inheres at a confrontation between the defendant and a third-party
who plays an influential role in the sentencing process. That question is an-
swered through examination of the second and third factors.
Procedural Complexity
The presentence interview is an outwardly simple procedure that will
lead to myriad and complex consequences. Even lawyers find the guide-
lines a baffling puzzle. At the presentence interview, simple answers to
simple questions may have hidden and contingent consequences, compre-
hensible only to those versed in the minutiae of the sentencing guidelines.
If a defendant admits to heretofore unknown criminal conduct, that admis-
sion can result in an increase in his Criminal History Category. If the pro-
bation officer believes that the defendant lied during the interview, the
parties may have to litigate under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 351 If the probation offi-
cer finds the defendant to be insincere in his professed remorse, the parties
will litigate whether the defendant receives no adjustment, or a two-point
adjustment, or a three-point adjustment for the acceptance of responsibility
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.. 352 This factor clearly weighs in favor of the right to
counsel.
Prejudice and Benefit
There can be no doubt that grave prejudice can occur at the presen-
tence interview. Admissions of criminal conduct can increase the defen-
dant's criminal relevant conduct. Misunderstandings arising out of
350 See, e.g., PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 160, at 7-29.
The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence teaches that the right to counsel attaches at
'critical' stages in the criminal process where 'the results might well settle the accused's fate.'
[U]nder the guidelines regime, an admission to a probation officer may dictate a substantially in-
creased sentence. Moreover, the presentence interview is designed to elicit information relevant to
the guidelines sentencing factors. In a very real sense, therefore, the presentence interview is criti-
cal to the ultimate sentencing determination.
Id. (citations omitted).
351 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2002).
352 Id. § 3E.L.
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nervousness, confusion, embarrassment, or timidity may be interpreted as
an obstruction of justice. A demeanor or description of the offense that ap-
pears insincere may cost the defendant a three-point downward adjustment
for the acceptance of responsibility. 53 An attorney can help insure that
these "unnecessary misunderstandings between the probation officer and
the defendant" do not occur.354
If the probation officer and the defendant disagree about what occurred
at the interview, the defendant faces a grave risk that the judge will credit
the probation officer's testimony. As it was in Wade, it is difficult here to
image how counsel could effectively rebut claims about statements her cli-
ent made, or the demeanor her client had, at a presentence interview that
counsel did not attend.
Counsel's advice to the defendant forewarning him about the proceed-
ing will not suffice to ameliorate the potential harms.355 Although probation
officers assert that they are neutral investigators and guidelines "account-
ants," there are significant subjective elements to the probation officer's
conclusions. 56 And a probation officer with a "law enforcement" inclina-
tion may lead an uncounselled defendant into making a statement that justi-
fies a sentence enhancement.
Thus, all three proposed indicia of a need for counsel are present and
the right to counsel should extend to the presentence interview.
C. Rule 35(b) Proceedings
Where the parties to a Rule 35 proceeding have signed a cooperation
agreement, the extension of the right to counsel seems a natural and just ap-
plication of the Supreme Court's holding in Mempa. After all, the Mempa
Court emphatically insisted that a defendant had the right to counsel at a
"deferred sentence" proceeding regardless of its name. The court consid-
ered the purposes of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee and con-
cluded that the provision of counsel at the deferred sentence was the only
way to accomplish those purposes. Nevertheless, despite Mempa, a signifi-
353 Id.
354 FED. R. CRIM P. 32 advisory committee's note on 1994 amendments. The notes envision that the
"burden should rest on defense counsel." Id. The Committee makes no suggestion as to what course to
follow if a defendant wants counsel to be present and counsel does not attend.
355 See, e.g., Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-tasking at Sentencing, 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 581-86 (1996) (discussing presentence investigation and possible conse-
quences of probation officers' biases).
356 Lucien B. Campbell & Henry J. Bemporad, Introduction to Federal Guideline Sentencing, 10
FED. SENTENCING REP. 323 (1998); Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the
Application of the Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1BI.3, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 16 (1997) (signifi-
cant variations in application of relevant conduct rules when identical information provided to forty-six
probation officers).
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cant body of law holds that a Rule 35(b) proceeding is not a critical stage.
Accordingly, this part of the Article analyzes the Rule 35(b) cooperation
process by considering whether it bears the hallmarks of a proceeding at
which counsel is required.
Adversariness-in-fact
In post-judgment cooperation, if no appeal is pending, the government
and the defendant are not, in any formal sense, adversaries. As some courts
have correctly noted, the defendant in a Rule 35(b) cooperation does not
face any new risks. The sentence has been lawfully imposed and the Rule
35(b) proceeding is merely a benefit that the defendant seeks and that the
government can choose to confer or withhold.
This facile analysis conceals the true nature of Rule 35(b) agreements
and thereby mistakes a formality (the defendant has been sentenced) for a
finality (the defendant has received a final sentence). In fact, the defen-
dant's sentence was, at worst, a "dry run" and, at best, a halfway step to the
completed bargain that contemplated post-judgment assistance.
Has the government committed itself to prosecute? Yes, as to the un-
derlying charge. However, that case has ended, albeit temporarily. Has the
government evinced any intention to file new charges? No. However, as in
pre-charge bargaining, a truly adversary relationship has been hidden by a
convenient fiction. Notwithstanding the existence of the cooperation
agreement, the government and the defendant are not allies and the imposi-
tion of a "preliminary sentence" does not change the parties' allegiances. If
the government fails to honor its bargain, the defendant has legal recourse;
claims under Santobello v. New York can compel the government to provide
specific performance of a plea bargain.357 If the sentenced defendant fails to
keep his part of the bargain, the government has a powerful weapon in inac-
tion. Accordingly, the defendant and the government are adversaries in a
process that holds the defendant's sentence in the balance. Moreover, this
is a case in which temporal fortuity is the cause of the Sixth Amendment
inquiry; had the same facts presented themselves in a 5K1. 1 situation, the
defendant would have access to counsel.358 Accordingly, this factor weighs
in favor of the right to counsel.
Procedural Complexity
The fact that a sentence, however temporary, has been imposed miti-
gates, to some extent, the complexities facing the defendant. A lawful sen-
tence has been imposed. Absent a timely motion by the government, that
357 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 257 (1971).
358 United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); but see United States v. Ming He,
94 F.3d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting but not holding that the Sixth Amendment provides for the
right to counsel and that this right is protected by relying on the supervisory power of the court).
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sentence is final. This simple reality means that the procedural complexity
factor weighs against the extension of the right to counsel. The triggering
procedure is not a complex one; the government need only file a motion.
Because the sentence has been imposed and the Rule 35 clock is now tick-
ing, this increases the extent to which analysis of this factor will depend
heavily upon the prejudice/benefit analysis.
Prejudice/Benefit
Risks endemic to the cooperation process will plague the Rule 35 co-
operator. If the government needs to continue to debrief the defendant, the
defendant may be too nervous or too intimidated to provide all the informa-
tion he otherwise could. An unsuccessful debriefing would obviously have
a prejudicial impact on the defendant's ability to perform under his plea
bargain and receive the benefit of his bargain, a subsequent motion for sen-
tence reduction under Rule 35. Counsel can mitigate this potential preju-
dice by preparing her client for and by participating in debriefing sessions
with the prosecution.
The defendant faces even greater risks under Rule 35 procedures than
he would as a cooperating defendant under § 5K1.1. The defendant is serv-
ing a lawfully imposed sentence. Absent a timely government motion for
sentence reduction, that sentence will stand. Thus, the defendant faces a
substantial risk that the government will, either deliberately or inadver-
tently, fail to timely file the motion, thereby rendering the defendant's
"temporary" sentence a permanent one. In such a circumstance, counsel
could completely obviate that potential prejudice by reminding the prosecu-
tor to timely file the motion or, if necessary, by seeking the court's assis-
tance in requiring the prosecutor to honor the plea bargain. An incarcerated
defendant lacks easy access to the courts.
Alternatively, the prosecutor might timely file the motion but fail to
accurately describe the factors the court must consider in assessing the ex-
tent of any departure.359 In that case, the risk to the defendant is that he will
be sentenced on an incomplete record and will receive a sentence substan-
tially greater than he might have if the court were aware of all relevant
facts. Particularly as the defendant has no right to appear at a Rule 35 re-
sentence, counsel would provide a crucial counterbalance to the prosecu-
tion's presentation. In contrast to a defendant unfamiliar with guidelines
practice, counsel can focus on, and illuminate for the court, those aspects of
the defendant's cooperation that merit a substantial departure from the
guidelines.
359 See discussion supra Part 11.
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As noted earlier, a Rule 35 motion for downward departure carries all
of the risks, and potential rewards, of a sentence. When evaluated by refer-
ence to the Court's traditional inquiry about whether counsel is essential to
fair process at sentence, it becomes clear that, despite the lack of procedural
complexity, the right to counsel should inhere to Rule 35(b) proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was designed to counterbalance
the tremendous advantage the government has in a criminal prosecution.36 °
For symbolic and practical reasons, the counsel clause is the "touchstone"
of the Sixth Amendment.36' It is the tool by which our criminal justice sys-
tem protects the accused, secures a truly adversary proceeding, and thereby
promotes the systemic goal of fair process.362 If we are to honor the Sixth
Amendment's promise, we must continue in the Supreme Court's tradition
of an evolving jurisprudence and respond to the changing realities of our
criminal justice system by reimagining the right to counsel.
360 GARCIA, supra note 11, at n.3 (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1977) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (describing the awesome power of indictment, "the virtually limitless resources of govern-
ment investigators" and Constitutional imperative to "redress the advantage that inheres in a government
prosecution")).
361 Id. at 2. Accord Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978) ("In an adversary system of jus-
tice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel.").
362 HELLER, supra note 10, at 143 ("The guarantees of the Sixth Amendment were intended to as-
sure... a fair trial."); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 77 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (The right to counsel "assures
the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process.") (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
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